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SECTION 4 OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT:
THE EXCLUDED CORPORATIONS
MICHAEL I. SOVERN*
Section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act excludes from both voluntary
and involuntary bankruptcy municipal, railroad, insurance and
banking corporations and building and loan associations, and ex-
cludes from involuntary bankruptcy corporations that are not "mon-
eyed, business or commercial."'- The exclusion of railroad and mu-
nicipal corporations lost much of its significance when special
reorganization provisions were enacted for those corporations.2 In-
surance and banking corporations and building and loan associa-
tios, on the other hand, are excluded from the Bankruptcy Act's
*Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Associate
Professor of Law, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. 30 Stat. 547 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C § 22 (1952). The full
text of this section is as follows:(a) Any person, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking
corporation or a building and loan association, shall be entitled to the
benefits of this title as a voluntary bankrupt.
(b) Any natural person, except a wage earner or farmer, and any
moneyed, business, or commercial corporation, except a building and loan
association, a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation,
owing debts to the amount of $1,000 or over, may be adjudged an in-
voluntary bankrupt upon default or an impartial trial and shall be sub-
ject to the provisions and entitled to the benefits of this title. The
bankruptcy of a corporation shall not release its officers, the members of
its board of directors or trustees or of other similar controlling bodies,
or its stockholders or members, as such, from any liability under the
laws of a State or of the United States. The status of an alleged bank-
rupt as a wage earner or farmer shall be determined as of the time of the
commission of the act of bankruptcy.
2. The special railroad provision is Bankruptcy Act § 77, 47 Stat. 1474
(1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1952) ; see 5 Collier, Bankruptcy §§
77.01-77.29 (14th ed. 1943) ; Billyou, Railroad Reorganization Since Enact-
ment of Section 77, 96 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 793 (1948) ; Swaine, A Decade of
Reorganization under Section 77 of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 56 Harv. L.
Rev. 1037, 1193 (1943). Any railroad corporation that is not subject to § 77
may be reorganized under Chap. X of the Bankruptcy Act. Bankruptcy Act
§ 106(3), 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 506(3) (1952). A 1948 amend-
ment of the Interstate Commerce Act offers an alternative to the bankruptcy
reorganization of railroads. 62 Stat. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 20(b) (1952) ;
see Polatsek, The Wreck of the Old 77, 34 Cornell L. Q. 532, 564-568 (1949).
The special municipality provision is Bankruptcy Act Chap. IX, 50 Stat. 655,(1937), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-403 (1952) ; see 5 Collier, Bankruptcy
§§ 81.01-81.27 (14th ed. 1943) ; Clark, Procedure Under Act for Composi-
lion of Indebtedness of Local Agencies, 20 Ore. L. Rev. 316 (1941).
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corporate reorganization chapters as well as from straight bank-
ruptcy; and creditors can no more compel a corporation that is
not moneyed, business or commercial to reorganize than they can
compel it to liquidate.8
This article will be concerned with several questions raised by
section 4. First, how have bankruptcy courts defined banks, insur-
ance corporations, building and loan associations and corporations
that are not moneyed, business or commercial ?4 Second, how should
these terms be defined? And, third, should all, or any, of these
exclusions be retained? We shall preface our discussion of these
questions with a summary of the legislative history of section 4
since corporations were first made amenable to bankruptcy in 1867.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As originally drafted, the Act of 1867 would have made all cor-
porations amenable to both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy.
Fear was expressed in the Senate that "[U]nder the involuntary
system proceedings would be instituted against religious and edu-
cational and eleemosynary corporations and they wound up." To
avoid this danger, the bill's floor manager offered to limit the stat-
ute to "moneyed and business" corporations. This dialogue ensued:
Mr. Howard. Let me suggest as a substitute for the word "busi-
3. Corporate reorganization under Chap. X of the Bankruptcy Act is
possible only for a corporation "which could be adjudged a bankrupt under
this Act, and any railroad corporation excepting a railroad corporation
authorized to file a petition under section 77 of this Act." Bankruptcy Act 6§
106(3), 526, 52 Stat. 883, 885 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 506(3), 526 (1952). This
has been interpreted to mean that a voluntary petition for reorganization may
be filed only by a corporation which could file a voluntary petition in bank-
ruptcy, and an involuntary petition for reorganization may be filed only against
a corporation which could be filed against in bankruptcy. See 6 Collier,
Bankruptcy §§ 2.07, 4.05, 4.06 (14th ed. 1943), and authorities there cited.
An arrangement under Chap. XI of the Bankruptcy Act is available only to
"a person who could become a bankrupt under section 4 of this Act and who
files a petition under this chapter." Bankruptcy Act §§ 306(3), 321, 322, 52
Stat. 906, 907 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(3), 721, 722 (1952). Consequently, a
corporation which cannot file a voluntary petition in bankruptcy cannot file
a petition for an arrangement. See 8 Collier, Bankruptcy §§ 2.09, 4.02 (14th
ed. 1943), and authorities there cited.
4. We will not consider the questions raised by the Bankruptcy Act's
peculiar definition of "corporation." See Bankruptcy Act § 1(8), 30 Stat.
544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1952). They have been ably
treated elsewhere. See, e.g., McLaughlin, Amendment of the Bankruptcy Act,
40 Harv. L. Rev. 341, 355 (1927) ; Tondel, Corporations Eligible for Relief
under Section 77B, 21 Minn. L. Rev. 144 (1937) ; Weinstein, Corporations
Amenable to Section 77B, 83 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 853 (1935). The question
with which we are concerned is: assuming that a particular entity is a corpo-
ration within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, what must be shown to
bring it within one of the excluded classes?
5. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 987 (1867).
6. Id. at 989.
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ness" the word "commercial." It seems to me that the word
"business" is a little more comprehensive than the word "com-
mercial," and may be construed to include all corporations to
carry on any kind of business, even the business of distributing
charities or the business of employing teachers in schools, or of
conducting religious exercises. Certainly the Senator from Ver-
mont does not design to include such corporations....
Mr. Poland. I desire to obtain precisely the same result by this
amendment that the Senator from Michigan desires, if we can
only agree upon the exact word. My amendment proposes to
limit this section to moneyed and business corporations, and
the Senator from Michigan proposes the word "commercial"
instead of the word "business."
Mr. Howard. Then I will suggest to the Senator to add the
word "commercial," so that it will read, "moneyed, business, or
commercial corporations."
Mr. Poland. I accept that.7
And so did the rest of Congress, notwithstanding the fact that
by limiting voluntary as well as involuntary proceedings to "mon-
eyed, business, or commercial corporations" the amendment went
considerably further than the fear expressed required.
8
The bill which, substantially overhauled, was to become the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 employed a different approach to the sub-
ject of corporate bankruptcy. Voluntary bankruptcy was closed to
all corporations; involuntary was open to all corporations except
national banks.9 In response to the objection that the latter provi-
sion would permit municipalities and other governmental corpora-
tions to be involuntarily adjudicated, 10 the bill's definition of corpo-
ration was amended on the Senate floor to read, "[A] body doing
business as a merchant, broker, banker, trader, manufacturer, or
miner . . . ."" However, largely because of anti-corporation senti-
ment,'12 corporations were entirely excluded from involuntary as
well as from voluntary bankruptcy before the bill passed the Senate.13
The bill reported by the House Judiciary Committee reverted to
the original Senate provision on corporations, subjecting all corpo-
rations except national banks to involuntary bankruptcy and ex-
cluding all corporations from voluntary bankruptcy.' 4 The same
objections to the involuntary provision that had been raised in the
7. Id. at 1002.
8. The amended provision became § 37 -of the Act of March 2, 1867, c.
176, 14 Stat. 535, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, c. 160, 20 Stat. 99.
9. See 30 Cong. Rec. 606 (1897).
10. See id. at 787.
11. Id. at 789.
12. See ibid.
13. See id. at 801.
14. See 31 Cong. Rec. 1780 (1898).
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Senate were again brought up in the House, 5 but they did not
prevail. The statement of Congressman Bodine, one of the oppo-
nents of the corporate provision, was unique and rather significant
in view of the form section 4 was to take in 1910:
This bill is the first one of its kind to include corporations
at all.16 It may be that there is a certain class of corporations
that are as appropriately made subject to its provisions as are
natural persons. I refer to those engaged in mining, manufactur-
ing, merchandising, trading, and the buying and selling of prop-
erty of any kind, and, in fine, engage in any business of the same
kind as that usually carried on by individuals. But this bill goes
much further than this. It embraces insurance companies...; it
embraces building and loan associations, trust companies, sav-
ings banks, and all other State banks.
Now, in nearly every State in the Union there are chapters
on chapters of the statutes regulating to the smallest minutia
the proceedings in case of the insolvency of any of those classes
of corporations. It is made the duty of designated officials to
make critical and periodical examination of their affairs, to
proceed against them when insolvent, and to take charge of their
property, including the securities deposited for the protection of
the beneficiaries... and, in fine, to do and perform all the duties
of a trustee in bankruptcy.
Under this bill a trustee in bankruptcy becomes the insur-
ance commissioner, the railroad commissioner, the bank ex-
aminer and commissioner, and the building and loan commis-
sioner of the several States....
[N]ot content with invading the domain of the State, not
content with its jurisdiction over every kind of corporation
organized for business purposes, it invades the domain of
charity and religion.
If a church is a corporation and is guilty of an act of in-
solvency-which it can be under this bill without violating a
single precept of the Master-it can be thrown into bankruptcy,
and the trustee can take into his possession and sell the bread
and wine and the cup and plate which contain them and the
sacred book itself [laughter], and leave its members nothing
except their hope of salvation in another world .... 17
Mr. Bodine's statement was not to influence the House's action,
for the Committee's bill passed,' 8 nor can it be ascertained whether
the conference committee appointed to settle the differences be-
tween the House and Senate bills took any notice of what he said,
but by 1932 all save one of the exclusions suggested by him have
15. See id. at 1794.
16. This, of course, is an error. See text at notes 5-8 supra and authori-
ties there cited.
17. 31 Cong. Rec. 1939 (1898).
18. See id. at 1947.
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found their way into the Bankruptcy Act. Further, when the courts
are called upon to divine the reason for the exclusion of banks,
insurance corporations and building and loan associations, Mr.
Bodine's thoughts appear in the opinions with surprising frequency,
although no reference to him is ever made.'0
The conference committee's bill, which became the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, retained the bar against voluntary bankruptcy for
corporations, supplemented the exclusion of national banks from
involuntary bankruptcy by excluding banks incorporated under state
or territorial law as well, and limited involuntary bankruptcy in
general to corporations "engaged principally in manufacturing,
trading, printing, publishing, or mercantile pursuits."2 0 This list
of corporations subject to involuntary bankruptcy bears a strong
resemblance to the list originally inserted on the Senate floor,21 but
it is improbable that the conference committee, like the Senate,
adopted the list merely to avoid the involuntary adjudication of
governmental corporations. The committee's explanation for ex-
cluding from involuntary bankruptcy banks and all corporations not
enumerated appears in a statement accompanying the conference
report: "The great railroad and transportation companies and banks
incorporated under any law are left to be dealt with by the laws of
the State creating them. It would lead to much confusion and hard-
ship and many complications should we undertake to subject the
great railroad and. transportation corporations to the provisions of
this act. It is believed that they can be better dealt with under other
laws."22 No effort is made to explain why it is desirable to leave
certain corporations "to be dealt with by the laws of the states creat-
ing them." The Senate bill's exclusion of national banks had been
justified by the Senator in charge of the bill on this basis: "There is
already in existence a satisfactory law for the control and liquidation
of national banks. Since the Government is responsible for the bank
notes issued by these banks in the event of their failure, there is
good reason why it should have control of their liquidation. '23 The
conference committee's rather vague statement leaves us to con-
jecture whether these factors were at all influential in the com-
mittee's thinking.
19. See, e.g., Sims v. Fidelity Assurance Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442, 449 (4th
Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943); In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage
Co., 75 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935); Woolsey v.
Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334, 337 (5th Cir. 1935).
20. See 31 Cong. Rec. 6427 (1898).
21. See text supra at note 11.
22. 31 Cong. Rec. 6427 (1898).
23. 30 Cong. Rec. 606 (1897).
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To a considerable extent the 1910 amendment of section 424 was
a throwback to the Act of 1867.5 Corporations, with the exception
of municipal, railroad, insurance and banking corporations, were
readmitted to voluntary bankruptcy, and "any moneyed, business, or
commercial corporation, except a municipal, railroad, insurance, or
banking corporation," could be adjudicated an involuntary bank-
rupt. The House Report, which is quoted without more by the
Senate Report, indicates that one of the reasons for the change
from the 1898 formulation was a need for clarification,26 but Con-
gress probably did not think it was merely -tinkering with the
existing statute. The House Report goes on to say:
The words substituted ["moneyed, business, or commercial
corporation"] are taken from the bankruptcy law of 1867, and
their meaning has long since been settled by the courts. The
reason for exempting the quasi-public corporations will be ap-
parent. Banks are excepted from the operation of the law at
present. Other business entities having similar responsibilities to
the public are now also excepted.27
That something different from the 1898 Act was being done is also
indicated by the statement of the manager of the bill: "The changes
here are intended to broaden the present law so far as it affects
corporations. As the law now stands only corporations 'engaged
principally in manufacturing, trading, printing, publishing, mining,
or mercantile pursuits' can be proceeded against by creditors.
There is no good reason for these distinctions."2
The business corporations completely excluded from bankruptcy
by the amendment are essentially those suggested by Congress-
man Bodine during the House debate on the Act of 1898. Was his
reason for differentiating between those corporations and others
the reason for the distinctions made by the amendment? Are rail-
road, insurance and banking corporations different from others be-
cause, "it is made the duty of designated officials to make critical
and periodical examination of their affairs, to proceed against
them when insolvent, and to take charge of their property .... " ?29
The committee report says only that corporations having "responsi-
bilities to the public" similar to those of banks are excepted.
24. 36 Stat. 838 (1910).
25. See text at notes 5-8 supra.
26. See H.R. Rep. No. 511, Ser. No. 5591, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 4(1910) ; Sen. Rep. No. 691, Ser. No. 5584, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1910).
27. H.R. Rep. No. 511, supra note 26, at 5; Sen. Rep. No. 691, supra
note 26, at 5.
28. 45 Cong. Rec. 2276 (1910). Mining corporations had been added to
the list of corporations that might be adjudicated involuntary bankrupts in
1903. Act of February 5, 1903, c. 487, 32 Stat 797.
29. See text at note 17 supra.
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The next step with which we are concerned occurred in 1932,
when building and loan associations were added to the cluster of
excluded corporations." Only trust companies were now lacking to
complete Congressman Bodine's list. Why this new exclusion? The
House Report tells us first that, "Every reason which obtains for
exempting [banks, etc.] obtains in so far as building and loan
associations are concerned." 3' 1 Consequently, when the Report goes
on to give the reasons for the new exception, we might expect to
find the committee's view of the reasons for the exceptions created
by the 1910 amendment.
[I]t has been suggested that by reason of the fact that in
two States in the Union no law exists controlling building and
loan associations that this might be a reason for not exempting
these associations from the operation of the bankruptcy law. It
will be remembered that if the bankruptcy law is not invoked in
connection with building and loan associations that this in no
way interferes with the State equity laws, and whether a State
has supervisory control over building and loan associations or
not those interested may at all times take advantage of State in-
solvency laws. Building and loan associations are of a peculiar
nature, associations functioning almost exclusively in local com-
munities. The deposits received are from local depositors and the
securities taken are local securities. Therefore, it seems the part
of wisdom to leave the administration of these matters in the
local courts.
32
The first two quoted sentences are interesting for their implication
about the committee's position on Congressman Bodine's rationale.
State supervision is apparently not the controlling factor, for
"whether a State has supervisory control over building and loan
associations or not those interested may at all times take advantage
of State insolvency laws." The Report rather clearly rests the excep-
tion of building and loan associations on the ground that they are
local institutions. Obviously, then, the reason for exempting build-
ing and loan associations cannot have been the reason for at least
two of the other exceptions; the exclusion of railroad and insurance
corporations could not conceivably have been based on the ground
that they were local institutions. The locality point was also made
on the floor of Congress, but Mr. Bodine's theory fared better there
than it did with the committee, one congressman stating:
I have had some experience in the management of these building
and loan associations. They are entirely under the management
of State laws. Nearly all of them have State inspectors to check
30. 47 Stat 47 (1932), 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1952).
31. H.R. Rep. No. 98, Ser. No. 9491, 72 Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1932).
32. Ibid.
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up on their books and securities. They are subject to the State
law respecting voluntary assignments and receiverships, and
there is every reason why they should be taken out from under
the Federal Bankruptcy law and be allowed the usual course
taken under State management and State law.
3 3
The next significant action on this subject is the enactment in
1934 of section 77B which declared eligible for corporate reorganiza-
tion "Any corporation which could become a bankrupt under sec-
tion 4 of this Act."3 4 Congress thus adopted for its new remedy of
reorganization the exclusions it had worked out earlier for liquida-
tion."5 Counsel to a special committee set up to study bankruptcy
and receivership later said, "It is doubtful whether the draftsmen
gave any real consideration to the problem, it being more probable
that they chose the easier method of adopting a standard already
set up in section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act."' 3 6
Whatever mysterious attraction the standard of section 4 held
33. 75 Cong. Rec. 3041 (1932). Sen. Rep. No. 120, Ser. No. 9487, 72d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1932), the Senate Judiciary Committee's Report on the bill
exempting building and loan associations from bankruptcy, offers no reasons
in support of its recommendation that the bill be enacted into law.
34. Act of June 7, 1934, c. 424, 48 Stat. 911.
35. The statement in the text is subject to the qualification that corporate
reorganization was possible to a limited extent under § 12 of the Bankruptcy
Act even before the adoption of 77B. Section 12 permitted a debtor to propose
a composition to his creditors after a petition in bankruptcy had been filed.
Obviously, since a petition could not be filed by or against a corporation ex-
cluded by § 4, the § 4 exclusions were applicable to this limited form of
reorganization as well as to liquidation. For a summary of the various inade-
quacies of § 12 as a reorganization device, see 6 Collier, Bankruptcy § 0.03
(14th ed. 1943). Because of these inadequacies, § 12 was a little-used and in-
significant provision of the Bankruptcy Act, and was repealed in 1938 by
the Chandler Act. 52 Stat. 840 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 30 (1952). It remains
true, then, that the primary function of the Bankruptcy Act before the adop-
tion of 77B was liquidation, and there is little doubt that the § 4 exclusions
were adopted with an eye to that function rather than to reorganization.
36. Report of the Counsel to the Special Committee to the Chairman
of the Special Committee to Investigate Receivership and Bankruptcy Pro-
ceedings and Administration of Justice in United States Courts, Sen. Doc.
No. 268, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1936). However, after section 77B was
enacted, Congressman Tom McKeown, chairman of the Subcommittee on
Bankruptcy of the House judiciary Committee, stated that the problem was
considered by the conference committee on the bill that was to become 77B:
While the bill was pending in the Senate for passage, a great urge came
to make eligible for relief banks, insurance companies, and building and
loan associations which had ceased functioning as such, but the request
came too late to put the amendment in the bill in the Senate. When the
conference met, an amendment was offered to take care of the situation.
The difficulty that faced the conference committee was the fact that the
language defining what corporations could avail themselves of the
privileges of the bill had passed the Senate just as it came from the
House, so that the conference committee under the rules could not change
the first part of section 77B. McKeown and Langeluttig, Federal Debtor
Relief Laws 4 (1935).
The Senate had, however, added to the House provision permitting a petition
for reorganization after a proceeding in bankruptcy has been commenced, the
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for the original draftsmen of section 77B apparently manifested itself
to the authors of Chapter X, the Chandler Act's replacement for
section 77B, for section 106(3) provides that "'corporation' shall
mean a corporation, as defined in this Act, which could be adjudged
a bankrupt under this Act. . . . "7 The section 4 exclusions were
also adopted for Chapter XI, under which corporations and indi-
viduals may adjust their unsecured debts without suffering liquida-
tion.38 The legislative history contains no clues to why the liquida-
tion standard was adopted for reorganization provisions.
clause, "whether or not the corporation has been adjudicated a bankrupt."
The conference committee was free, therefore, to amend this provision, and,
according to Mr. McKeown, took advantage of this to make defunct banks,
insurance companies and building and loan associations eligible for reorgan-
ization by adding, "provided the present operations of such corporation do
not exclude it hereunder." Id. at 5, 109-111. As a result, the section permitted
"Any corporation which could become a bankrupt under section 4 of this
Act" to seek corporate reorganization either by original petition or by
petition "in any proceeding pending in bankruptcy, whether filed before or
after this section becomes effective, provided the present operations of such
corporations do not exclude it hereunder, and whether or not the corporation
has been adjudicated a bankrupt... ." Act of June 7, 1934, c. 424, 48 Stat.
911. Mr. McKeown's account explains why the language he claims made
defunct banks, insurance companies and building and loan associations eligible
for reorganization does not appear where one would expect to find it, but it
hardly explains the singular lack of relation between what this language seems
to say and what Mr. McKeown claims for it. All that language seems to do
is deny to a corporation by or against whom a bankruptcy proceeding has
been begun the right to petition for reorganization if its present operations
would make it ineligible for bankruptcy. It says nothing about making
corporations excluded by section 4 eligible for reorganization if they have
ceased doing business. Nothing in the legislative history of 77B indicates
that the rest of Congress shared Mr. McKeown's understanding of the con-
ference committee's amendment. In fact, neither the committee reports, the
Congressional Record, nor the reported hearings on section 77B reflect
the "great urge" to which Mr. McKeown refers. The only indication of con-
cern appearing in these materials is the insertion in the Congressional
Record of a speech by the superintendent of insurance of New York before
a convention of insurance commissioners in which he suggests that one
possible way of dealing with some of the difficulties of insurance company
liquidation would be to bring insurance corporations under the Bankruptcy
Act. 77 Cong. Rec. 5222 (1933). A number of cases expressly rejected the
contention that the "present operations" clause rendered defunct banks,
insurance corporations and building and loan associations eligible for re-
organization. E.g., In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 75 F.2d 984 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935) ; It re Peoria Life Ins. Co., 75 F.2d
777 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935). Finally, the "present opera-
tions" clause was omitted from Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, the
Chandler Act's replacement for 77B, and nothing in the legislative history
of Chapter X suggests that Congress thought that this omission changed
the law on the eligibility for reorganization of corporations excluded by
section 4.
37. 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 506(3) (1952).
38. The benefits of Chapter XI are available to "debtors," Bankruptcy
Act §§ 321, 322, 52 Stat. 907 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 721, 722 (1952), and a
"debtor" is defined as "a person who could become a bankrupt under section 4
of this Act and who files a petition under this chapter," Bankruptcy Act §
306(3), 52 Stat. 906 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 706(3) (1952).
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What conclusions can we draw from these various expressions
of Congress as to what is meant by a banking or insurance corpora-
tion, a building and loan association, or a corporation that is not
moneyed, business or commercial? Congress'. intent with respect to
the content of "moneyed, business or commercial" is fairly clear.
The phrase first appears in the Act of 1867 as a response to the
objection that upless bankruptcy is restricted to such corporations,
religious, educational and eleemosynary institutions might be in-
voluntarily adjudicated.39 And, as we shall see, the cases decided
under the Act of 1867 faithfully excluded religious, educational and
eleemosynary corporations from the scope of "moneyed, business or
commercial corporations," and confined that term to corporations
engaged in the pursuit of financial gain.40 When the language is
adopted again in the amendment of 1910, the House and Senate
Reports refer specifically to the judicial interpretation: "The words
substituted [moneyed, business or commercial corporation] are
taken from the bankruptcy law of 1867, and their meaning has long
since been settled by the courts."4' We can expect to find, then,
that the delimitation of corporations that are not moneyed, business
or commercial has proved to be a relatively easy chore for the
courts.
How much guidance does the legislative history give in defining
the other excluded corporations? For example, is there anything to
help a court decide whether a fraternal benefit society is an insurance
corporation because it pays death benefits to the benficiaries of its
members? It might be argued that Congress left the insolvency
administration of banking and insurance corporations and building
and loan associations to state law for the reason suggested by Mr.
Bodine, that "[I]n nearly every State in the Union there are chap-
ters on chapters of the statutes regulating to the smallest minutia
the proceedings in case of the insolvency of any of those classes of
corporations. '42 Therefore, the argument would run, a fraternal
benefit society should not be deemed an insurance corporation unless
the statutes of the state of incorporation specifically provide for close
regulation of such societies by officials who are to take charge of the
corporation in the event of insolvency. The argument suffers badly
from the lack of evidence in the history of section 4 that the rest
of Congress shared Mr. Bodine's views. There is slight support
39. See text at notes 5-8 supra.
40. See text at note 199 infra.
41. See H.R. Rep. No. 511, Ser. No. 5591, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1910);
Sen. Rep. No. 691, Ser. No. 5584, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1910).
42. See text at note 17 supra.
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in the deliberations preceding the passage of the Act of 1898, and
in the debate preceding the exemption of building and loan associa-
tions, but hardly enough to sustain the proposition that Congress
excluded banks, insurance corporations and building and loan
associations primarily because they were so extensively regulated
by the states.43 The argument suffers, too, from Congress' failure to
exclude all closely regulated enterprises from bankruptcy.
Another argument might draw upon the House Report on the
amendment of 1910 which justified the exclusion of railroad and
insurance corporations on the ground that their "responsibilities
to the public" were similar to those of banks :44 since a fraternal
benefit society has extensive responsibilities to the public, it should
be deemed an insurance corporation and held ineligible for bank-
ruptcy. But even if the legislative history contained additional sup-
port for a "responsibilities to the public" test, it would have to be
rejected as too vague to be helpful in the resolution of a close case.
Finally, we have the possibility of an argument based on the
House Report which emphasized the local operation of building
and loan associations as the reason for exempting such corporations
from bankruptcy :45 if a fraternal benefit society's activities are not
confined to one community, it should be eligible for bankruptcy and
hence should not be characterized as an insurance corporation. The
argument is easily refuted by the fact that many companies which
are concededly insurance corporations conduct their business on an
interstate scale. Therefore, Congress certainly did not exclude insur-
ance corporations from bankruptcy because they were local enter-
prises, and the geographical scope of a debtor's activities should
not be used to determine whether or not it is an insurance corpora-
tion.
It is, of course, possible, perhaps even probable, that banks,
insurance corporations and building and loan associations were not
all excluded from bankruptcy for the same reasons. It is possible,
too, that Congress had no more definite reason than a reluctance to
bring such crucial financial institutions within the purview of a
statute aimed primarily at liquidation, but preferred to leave them
under the aegis of the states and to courts of equity, where re-
habilitation would at least be a possibility. However, the failure of
the Chandler Act to make reorganization available to the excluded
43. The support offered by the debate on the bill exempting building and
loan associations is more than offset by the implication in the House Report
on that bill that state supervision is not crucial. See text at note 32 supra.
44. See text at note 27 supra.
45. See text at note 32 supra.
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corporations indicates that, whatever the earlier view of Congress,
it was not moved by this consideration in 193g. It is also possible
that the members of Congress had no particular alternative remedy
in mind, but simply did not wish to include corporations so im-
portant to our economy under a statute which permitted liquidation,
and later reorganization, to be compelled in the event of insolvency
by so unrepresentative a group as three creditors. In that event,
though, it would not have been necessary to exclude them from
voluntary as well as from involuntary bankruptcy.
Whatever purposes Congress may have intended to achieve by
excluding banking and insurance corporations and building and
loan associations from bankruptcy, the legislative history of sec-
tion 4 does not clearly reveal them. Consequently, we can expect
to find more judicial floundering when these exceptions are dealt
with than when courts are obliged to construe the exemption from
involuntary bankruptcy of corporations that are not "moneyed,
business or commercial." In addition to being clearer, the legis-
lative history of the moneyed, business or commercial clause
indicates that the reasons for this exclusion are probably different
from the reasons for the total exclusions. We shall, therefore,
deal with these two different types of exclusion separately, con-
sidering first the more difficult problems presented by the exclusion
of banks, insurance corporations and building and loan associations.
II. DEFINING BANKING AND INSURANCE CORPORATIONS AND
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS
A. The State Classification Test.
Three kinds of state action have been urged upon the courts as
warranting a holding that a given corporation is exempt from bank-
ruptcy, and hence to be left to the state of incorporation for liquida-
tion or reorganization. These are: (1) that the state of incorporation
has provided for liquidation or reorganization of corporations of this
type;4P (2) that the state of incorporation has declared that corpora-
tions of this type shall not be subject to the Bankruptcy Act ;4T and
(3) that the of incorporation has classified corporations of this
type as banking or insurance corporations or building and loan
associations. 48 The first and second points are usually raised to
bolster the third.
46. See, e.g., In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296
U.S. 646 (1935) ; Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1934).
47. See In re Prudence Co., .upra note 46.
48. See, e.g., Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1942),
aff'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943); Kansas ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, 62 F.2d 597
(10th Cir. 1932).
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Obviously, if these arguments are to be effective, it must be on
the theory that Congress wished the state indication to control.
Absent such a Congressional intent, the Bankruptcy Act would
override any state expressions on the amenability of corporations to
bankruptcy. The cases have not found this necessary intent when
only the first two kinds of state action listed above are involved. In
other words, the fact that the state of incorporation has provided
for liquidation or reorganization of some corporations or that
it has declared that those corporations shall not be subject to the
Bankruptcy Act is not by itself sufficient to except them from bank-
ruptcy 9
However, a number of cases have accepted as controlling the
state of incorporation's classification of a particular corporation as
a banking or insurance corporation or a building and loan associa-
tion.50 The operation of the state classification test in a rather
extreme form is illustrated by a comparison of two Second Circuit
cases decided four months apart, In re Union Guarantee & Mort-
gage Co., 1 and In re Prudence Co.5 2 The debtors in these two cases
were in the business 8f "making mortgage loans on real estate
and selling the mortgages to the public with [their] guaranty of
payment."5 I3 The Union Guarantee & Mortgage Company was held
to be an insurance corporation and hence ineligible for reorganiza-
tion under section 77B, but the Prudence Company was held to be
neither a bank nor an insurance corporation and hence eligible for
77B reorganization.
In the Union Guarantee case, the court first decided that the
purpose of excluding some corporations from bankruptcy was not
self-evident and that the purpose had to be inferred "from such
similarity as exists between the excepted groups."' , It found that the
corporations excluded were "affected with a public interest" and
required public supervision and control. From this the court rea-
soned that,
49. E.g., In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
646 (1935) (corporation held subject to Bankruptcy Act notwithstanding both
state provision for liquidation and state declaration that corporations of this
type shall not be subject to the Bankruptcy Act); Gamble v. Daniel, 39
F.2d 447 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 281 U.S. 705, cert. denied, 282 U.S.
848 (1930) (corporation held subject to Bankruptcy Act notwithstanding
state provision for liquidation).
50. E.g., In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 75 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935) ; Security Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Spurlock,
65 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 678 (1933).
51. 75 F2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935).
52. 79 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935).
53. Id. at 78; see 75 F.2d at 984.
54. 75 F.2d at 984.
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The most natural inference is that Congress meant to leave
to local winding up statutes the liquidation of such companies;
that, since the states commonly kept supervision over them dur-
ing their lives, it was reasonable that they should take charge
upon their demise .... If a state enacts that companies having
powers of a prescribed kind must be regulated, that is of course
authoritative; and, if in addition it classes the company as a bank
or a railroad or an insurer, that too should be authoritative....
This is true, not because Congress was bound to yield in such
cases, but because otherwise its apparent purpose to leave the
winding up of such companies to the state would not be effected;
for the will of the state is no clearer to supervise the company
than to class it as it does. When Congress excepted not all com-
panies affected with a public interest, but specified kinds of
such company, presumably it intended the states to define the
kinds.
Thus we have no occasion to decide whether the debtor at
bar ought not to have been incorporated under the new York
Insurance Law and regulated as such, whatever such a state-
ment could mean. Assuming that it should not, it was in fact
so subject and so incorporated. The state has chosen to regard
it so, and that is all we may ask.55
Unlike the Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., the Prudence
Co. was organized under the Banking Law of New York. Relying
upon In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., the superintendent of
banks argued that New York had classified the debtor as a bank-
ing corporation by allowing it to be incorporated under the Banking
Law, subjecting it to the supervision of the superintendent of
banks and providing a procedure for its liquidation. The argument
was rejected on the basis of an extensive consideration of the New
York Banking Law: New York had not classified this corporation
as a bank because the Banking Law expressly contemplated the
incorporation of several other types of corporation, in addition to
banks, under that statute. In the course of rejecting the superin-
tendent's argument the court also did some defining of banking
independently of state classification,5" but it rallied back to the state
classification test in its treatment of the contention that if the debtor
was not a bank, it must have been an insurance corporation. "[T]he
appellees reply that the state has not classified the debtor as an
insurance company, since it was not organized under the Insurance
law, and consequently we cannot, consistently with In re Union
55. Ibid.
56. "Hence the debtor does not possess the power to receive deposits,
which is generally recognized as the essential characteristic of a banking
business." 79 F.2d at 79. See text at notes 76 to 86 infra for a consideration
of the problems of characterizing banking corporations independently of state
classification.
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Guarantee & Mortgage Co.... hold the debtor exempt from bank-
ruptcy as an insurer. We think this answer is sound. '57
Certainly any test is suspect when its application results in only
one of two corporations empowered to engage in and actually
engaging in the same business being held subject to bankruptcy.
Putting aside for the present the question whether this apparent
contradiction can be justified, the reasoning employed by the Second
Circuit to arrive at the state classification standard is still subject
to criticism. If Congress had excluded banking and insurance corpo-
rations and building and loan associations from bankruptcy pri-
marily because they were extensively regulated by the states, then
perhaps a finding of exclusion might properly follow from a finding
that a debtor's state of incorporation subjected it to strict regulation
as a member of one of the excluded classes. But since there is little
evidence in the legislative history to support the proposition that
close state regulation was the principal reason for Congress' action,58
and since Congress, instead of excepting from bankruptcy all corpo-
rations which the states may strictly regulate, excepted only a
handful of such companies, the ultimate responsibility for dis-
tinguishing those companies from all others rests on the federal
courts. And, of course, in the absence of some indication to the
contrary, the definition of terms in a federal statute is a matter of
federal law and not to be supplied by the states.
Neither the Prudence nor the Union Guarantee opinion contains
any further justification for the state classification test, nor do most
of the other cases which accept this standard. An exception is
Security Building and Loan Association v. Spurlock,55 which sup-
ported the use of the state classification test for building and loan
associations in this way:
[A] t the time this amendment [excepting building and loan
associations] was passed many, if not all, of the states of the
union had theretofore authorized the formation of building and
loan associations described and characterized as such in the legis-
lation authorizing the incorporation thereof.... It follows that
when Congress enacted this legislation without any attempt to
define the characteristics of the building and loan associations
intended to be excluded from the operation of the Bankruptcy
Act, it necessarily recognized the various definitions thereof in
the statutes of the several states as indicating what constitutes
a building and loan association in the respective states. To at-
tempt by judicial construction to incorporate into the federal
57. Id. at 80.
58. See section I, supra, of this article.
59. 65 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 678 (1933).
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law some definition of a building and loan association would be
in effect to legislate upon that subject. Congress was satisfied
to take the state statutes as they found them and we must do so. 0
This reasoning, too, is subject to criticism. That state definitions
of building and loan association existed when building and loan
associations were added to the list of excluded corporations is un-
doubtedly true. It could be argued that if a particular corporation
would qualify as a building and loan association under all or most
of the state statutes in existence in 1932, Congress must have in-
tended it to be excluded, because that corporation is a building and
loan association according to the generally accepted contempo-
raneous definition. But it does not follow that by failing to define
the term, Congress intended to accept the definition of whatever
state happened to be the state of incorporation of a particular debtor.
The argument of the Spurlock opinion would have greater force if,
at the time of the amendment, the federal courts had definitely
adopted the state classification test, but at that time the weight
of authority favored independent characterization over acceptance
of a state classification. 61 As likely as the court's assumption is that
the United States Building and Loan League, the sponsor of the
amendment, felt that it would be tactically unsound to include a
definition of building and loan association when one of the argu-
ments to be used by the proponents of the amendments was the
similarity of building and loan associations to the already excluded
corporations,2 none of which was expressly defined by the Bank-
ruptcy Act. In short, there is nothing in the legislative history of the
1932 amendment to indicate that Congress had any intent one way
or the other on where the definition of building and loan associations
was to be found in a close case.
Is there anything to be said on behalf of the state classification
test? The preponderance of authority had shifted towards it between
1932 and 1938, but the use of the section 4 exclusions in Chapter X,
enacted in 1938, cannot be regarded as an implied legislative adoption
60. Id. at 771.
61. In re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity, 286 Fed. 180 (N.D.
Ga. 1923), expressly rejected the state classification test. Columbia Ry., Gas &
Electric Co. v. South Carolina, 27 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1928), and In re Grafton
Gas & Electric Light Co., 253 Fed. 668 (N.D. W.Va. 1918), characterized
the debtors at issue without referring to a state classification. Gamble v.
Daniel, 39 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.), appeal disnissed, 281 U.S. 705, cert. denied,
282 U.S. 848 (1930), and It re Bay Cities Guaranty Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 48
F.2d 623 (S.D. Cal. 1931), referred to state law, but relied principally on
independent characterization. In re Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 232 Fed. 199
(N.D. Cal. 1916), relied on both state classification and independent char-
acterization. Cf. In re Order of Sparta, 242 Fed. 235 E3d Cir. 1917).
62. See text at note 31 supra.
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of state classification because it was still not favored by all circuits63
and nothing in the legislative history indicates whether or not Con-
gress was aware of its existence. If the state classification test
offers a simple guide to lawyers attempting to predict whether a
particular corporation will be held subject to bankruptcy, it can
make some claim to legitimacy, for precise knowledge of available
remedies will reduce litigation and help business managers and
creditors to choose the most appropriate remedy. Wasted litigation
can be especially harmful to a tottering corporation and its creditors,
since, in addition to the expense involved, the corporation's position
63. See note 61 mpra. Independent characterization was also employed
in Clemons v. Liberty Savings & Real Estate Corp., 61 F.2d 448 (5th Cir.
1932), and in It re New York Title & Mortgage Co., 9 F. Supp. 319 (N.D.
N.Y. 1934). However, insofar as the latter decision relies on independent
characterization, it is presumably overruled by Prudence and Union Guar-
antee. Both state classification and independent characterization were relied
upon in Capital Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, 86 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1936)
(semble), Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1934), and
Kansas ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, 62 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1932). Grand Lodge,
Knights of Pythias v. McKee, 95 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1938), and It re Nat'l
Mortgage Corp., 17 F. Supp. 54 (D. N.J. 1935), relied entirely on the state
classification test.
Consequently, if Congress had attempted to ascertain the extent to which
the state classification test was the law in 1938, it would have found: that
the question had not been passed upon by the Supreme Court nor the First,
Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits; that the Second and Ninth Cir-
cuits regarded state classification as controlling; that the most recent deci-
sion of the Fifth Circuit was in accord, although there were earlier indica-
tions to the contrary; that the state classification test had been regarded as
controlling by a district court in the Third Circuit, but that the Court of
Appeals for that circuit had not yet spoken clearly, see In re Order of Sparta,
242 Fed. 235 (3d Cir. 1917) ; that the Fourth and Eighth Circuits seemed to
favor independent characterization; and that the Sixth and Tenth Circuits had
given roughly equal weight to state classification and independent character-
ization.
While the preponderance of authority thus shifted towards the state
classification test between 1932 and 1938, the test still was not sufficiently
established to sustain the argument that by adopting the § 4 exclusions for
Chapter X, Congress intended to ratify this judicial creation. Furthermore,
even two of the leading cases espousing state classification contain language
which smacks of independent characterization. Thus, in Security Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Spurlock, 65 F.2d 768, 772 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S.
678 (1933), the court looks beyond state classification, saying, "No one would
dispute, and it is not disputed here, that the definition of a building and loan
association contained in the Arizona statute is in accord with the general
conception of such organization throughout the United States." And In. re
Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935),
contains this statement: "Hence the debtor does not possess the power to
receive deposits, which is generally recognized as the essential characteristic
of a banking business.... And all of the cases, so far as we are advised, which
have construed the words 'banking corporation' as used in the Bankruptcy
Act, have regarded the legal power to receive deposits as the essential thing."
On the question whether the debtor is an insurance corporation, the court
concludes, "Since neither in conmon parlance nor by the terms of state legis-
lation is the debtor regarded as an 'insurance company,' it cannot be exempt
from bankruptcy under that phrase." (Italics supplied.) Id. at 80.
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is apt to continue to deteriorate while it awaits its fate, and these
additional losses may make the difference between liquidation and
a successful reorganization.
In order to determine whether the state classification test pro-
duces substantial predictability, we must look further into how this
standard has been applied by the courts. How is the state of
incorporation's classification of a given enterprise ascertained?
Obviously, when a bankruptcy court searches for a state classifica-
tion, its inquiry must be translated into: What has some govern-
mental organ of the state of incorporation said or done about this
corporation or one like it? Any one of the three principal branches
of government can conceivably be looked to for help, and, at one
time or another, all have been.6 4
Legislative characterizations are most consistently invoked. For
example, one court refused to hold the debtor before it an insur-
ance corporation when the debtor was expressly exempted by
statute from "all provisions of the insurance laws of this State, not
only in governmental relations with the State, but for every other
purpose." 65 Another, rejecting the contention that the debtor was a
bank, noted the failure of the legislature to impose double liability on
the stockholders of corporations like the debtor when the state consti-
tution required such liability to be imposed on the stockholders of
banks.66 Several cases compared the debtor with an express defini-
tion of, say, "banking" found in the state statutes. 7 The most com-
mon technique for discovering the legislature's classification is an
examination of the statute under which the debtor was organized
to determine what sort of enterprise the legislature contemplated
should be incorporated under that statute.68 Thus, the fact that
the debtor was organized under the state insurance law is highly
64. The usual caveat about blindly accepting a characterization of a
term rendered in one context when the meaning of that term is at issue in a
different context is probably not pertinent here. The rationale of the state
classification test-which asks how the state of incorporation regards corpo-
rations of this type--necessarily requires a bankruptcy court to see how corpo-
rations of this type have been treated in non-bankruptcy contexts.
65. Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. McKee, 95 F.2d 474, 476 (5th
Cir. 1938).
66. See In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
646 (1935).
67. See Security Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Spurlock, 65 F.2d 768 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 678 (1933) ; Kansas ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes,
62 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1932); Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.),
appeal dismrised, 281 U.S. 705, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848 (1930).
68. See, e.g., Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1934); Security Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Spurlock, supra note 67; Kansas
ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, mtpra note 67.
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persuasive evidence that the debtor is an insurance corporation,6"
while incorporation under a statute other than the insurance law is
virtually conclusive that the debtor is not an insurance corporation.
70
In fact, according to the Prudence case, failure to incorporate under
the insurance law prevents a debtor from being an insurance corpo-
ration even though it possesses the very same powers it would have
obtained by incorporation under that statute. While this theory
produced the different results in Prudence and Union Guarantee &
Mortgage, it is consistent with the judicial rationale for the state
classification test. The states are permitted to define insurance
corporations because Congress' primary purpose in excluding them
from bankruptcy was to avoid interference with the extensive regu-
latory schemes of the states, but if a debtor is not organized under
the state insurance law, it probably will not be regulated as an insur-
ance corporation, and so there is no reason to exclude it from bank-
ruptcy. If we treat predictability, rather than the usual judicial
rationale, as the basis for the state classification test, the different
results in Prudence and Union Guarantee & Mortgage can still be
justified. The status of a corporation will be easier to predict if the
statute under which it was incorporated is controlling than if its
activities and attributes must be compared with those of other
corporations that have been adjudicated or denied adjudication as
a bankrupt.
An administrative classification is often relied upon in conjunc-
tion with a legislative characterization. Every case which holds
that a debtor's state classified it as one of the excluded corporations
contains some indication that the state administrative official in
charge of such corporations treated the debtor as subject to his
jurisdiction.71 Action or inaction by a state official is accorded less
69. In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 75 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935). It re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935), is not in genuine conflict with the proposition
set forth in the text, even though it was held not to be a bank in spite of
incorporation under the New York Banking Law. The New York Banking
Law clearly contemplated that corporations other than banks would be
organized inder it. The title of that statute was "An Act in relation to bank-
ing corporations ... and corporations under the supervision of the banking
department," and the statute was subdivided into articles providing for
the incorporation of banks, trust companies, safe deposit companies, and in-
vestment companies. Consequently, whether the debtor was organized under
the Banking Law was only a preliminary question, the real question being
whether the debtor was incorporated under the article of that statute dealing
with banking corporations, and it wasn't
70. Capital Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, 86 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1936);
In re Prudence Co., supra note 69.
71. See, e.g., Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442 (4th Cir.
1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943); Republic Uderwriters v. Ford, 100 F.2d
511 (5th Cir. 1938); Kansas ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, 62 F.2d 597 (10th
Cir. 1932).
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significance by the cases holding that the debtor's state did not
classify it as one of the excluded corporations. Where, for example,
a debtor is held to fall outside a state's classification of insurance
corporation, the court's opinion may not refer to the state insurance
commissioner at all.7 2 In such cases the insurance commissioner
probably never took any action with respect to the debtor, since he is
not likely to supervise a corporation unless it was organized under
the insurance law. Nevertheless, the failure of the opinions to
mention the absence of administrative action tends to indicate that
this factor is not given as much weight as the statute under which
the debtor is incorporated. 73 The significance of administrative
action or inaction is further diminished by the practice in some
states of conferring jurisdiction on a particular official over more
than one type of corporation. Thus, the fact that the New York
Banking Law charged the department of banks with supervision of
several businesses other than banks persuaded the court in the
Prudence case not to attach great weight to the fact that the debtor
was supervised by the department of banking.74 Consequently,
while supervision of a debtor by, say, the state banking commissioner
may be a sine qua non to a finding that the state has classified the
debtor as a bank, the banking commissioner's supervision does not
by itself insure such a finding.
Judicial characterizations have been least referred to.75 This
does not, of course, necessarily mean that bankruptcy courts are
indifferent to what the courts of a debtor's state of incorporation
have had to say about corporations like the debtor. It may be that
the courts of the relevant state have not had occasion to pass upon
the question.
In sum, under the state classification test, an attorney consulted
72. See Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 136 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1943);
Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. McKee, 95 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1938) ;
In re Grand Lodge A.O.U.W., 232 Fed. 199 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
73, But see In re Bay Cities Guaranty Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 48 F.2d 623
(S.D. Cal. 1931), where the question was whether a building and loan associa-
tion was a banking corporation within the meaning of § 4. The court was im-
pressed by the fact that, "Building and loan associations under the laws of
California are not under the supervision of the banking department of the
state... ; they are not inspected by the superintendent of banks; there is a
separate supervising official who examines into their business affairs and who
checks improper or unsafe transactions and who may cause them to be
liquidated." Id. at 624.
74. Accord, Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed,
281 U.S. 705, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848 (1930) ; cf. Capital Endowment Co.
v. Kroeger, 86 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1936).
75. Judicial constructions were referred to in Republic Underwriters v.
Ford, 100 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1938) ; Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v.
McKee, 95 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1938).
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to determine the eligibility of a corporation for bankruptcy can
make a rather accurate prediction by merely studying the legislation
under which the debtor is incorporated; he can come quite close to
certainty if administrative and judicial characterizations concur
with that yielded by his study of the state statutes. Predictability
alone may be sufficient to justify the state classification test. We
will be in a better position to decide that after examining the
other choices.
B. Characterization by Bankruptcy Courts.
If a bankruptcy court rejects the state classification test, it is
faced with several problems that do not trouble the court which
elects to abide by the characterization of the state of incorporation.
It must, of course, provide its own definition of banking, insurance
or building and loan association. Furthermore, if the debtor whose
status is at issue is doing something different from what its charter
empowers it to do, the court must decide whether to regard the
debtor's powers or activities as controlling. We will consider first
the simpler situation in which the debtor is merely exercising the
powers conferred on it by its charter.
1. Activities Identical to Powers
a. Banking Corporations.
A corporation cannot be a banking corporation within the mean-
ing of section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act unless it has the power
to receive deposits. 70 The leading statement on the subject appears
in Gamble v. Daniel:
When Congress spoke of "banking corporations" it spoke as of
1910. It used the words in no technical nor special sense, but
as they were then ordinarily understood. As (sic) that time,
the ordinary conception of a bank was of a business which was
based primarily on the receipt of deposits (general or special),
which deposits were used by the bank for loans, discounts, buy-
ing and selling commercial paper, and other business purposes.
• . . The prime incentive in engaging in the business'was the
profit to be made, directly or indirectly, from use of deposits.
76. Compare Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1934) (debtor had power to receive deposits and was held a bank), and
Kansas ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, 62 F2d 597 (10th Cir. 1932) (debtor had
power to receive deposits and was held a bank), with In re Prudence Co., 79
F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935) (debtor lacked power to
receive deposits and was held not a bank), and Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d
447 (8th Cir.), appeal dimnissed, 281 U.S. 705, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848
(1930) (debtor lacked power to receive deposits and was held not a bank).
For a discussion of some problems in defining "deposit," see Note,
Insured Deposits under the Federal Deposit Insurance Law, 42 Colum. L.
Rev. 1030 (1942). These problems have not caused any difficulty in the
bankruptcy cases.
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Most of the then existing state legislation concerning banks had
as its principal purpose the protection of such depositors. Much
of the right to regulate banks was the public interest in protect-
ing depositors.... Other businesses might and did, and still do,
deal in commercial paper, make loans or borrow money without
any one thinking of them as banks. When a business takes de-
posits and then does the above or related things, every one
knows it is doing a banking business.... In short, while there
may be other attributes which a bank may possess, yet a neces-
sary one is the receipt of deposits which it may use in its busi-
ness.77
While the power to receive deposits is undoubtedly an indi-
spensable prerequisite to a finding of banking, it does not follow that
any corporation with that power is a bank. What more is needed and
the extent to which non-banking activities carried on in conjunction
with the receipt of deposits will prevent a finding of banking are not
clear.
Before building and loan associations were expressly excluded
from bankruptcy, the question whether such organizations were
banks was raised. Notwithstanding the fact that building and loan
associations normally receive and repay deposits much like a sav-
ings bank, In re Bay Cities Guaranty Buitding-Loan Ass'n held that
a building and loan association was not a bank.7 8 The court pointed
out the debtor's lack of power to "have or carry upon its books...
any demand, commercial or checking account or any credit to be
withdrawn upon the presentation of any negotiable check or draft."**
In Clemonsv. Liberty Savings & Real Estate Corp., the Fifth
Circuit held that the debtor was not a bank even though it was em-
powered "to conduct a savings department . . . with the right to
receive deposits not subject to check, and to pay interest thereon."' 8
The debtor's other powers included "the right to buy, sell, rent,
lease, hire, develop, improve, own, control, and manage improved
and unimproved real estate; to make contracts for constructing
buildings; to buy, sell, and deal in stocks, bonds, promissory notes,
and all kinds of choses in action; to advance or lend money to its
stockholders or other persons, and to adopt a system of loans, ad-
vances, terms, and payments in installments in like manner, as to its
interest charges and computations as may be done by building and
loan associations... ."8 The opinion does not even intimate that these
powers were incompatible with a finding of banking. On the con-
77. 39 F.2d at 450.
78. 48 F2d 623 (S.D. Cal. 1931).
79. Id. at 624.
80. 61 F2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1932).
81. Ibid.
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trary, the Liberty Savings & Real Estate Corporation was not a
bank because it lacked something essential to a finding of banking.
The court said, "It is evident that appellee was organized to do a
general savings and loan business, something less than either a bank
or a building and loan association." '82 What was lacking was not
stated, although the opinion seems to suggest that the case for a
finding of banking would have been aided by the presence of power
to permit depositors to make withdrawals by check.8 3
Since both Clemons v. Liberty Savings & Real Estate Corp. and
In re Bay Cities Guaranty Building-Loan Ass'n leaned in part on
state classification as well as independent characterization, the sig-
nificance of their conclusion that the power to receive deposits is
not enough to sustain a holding of banking is somewhat lessened.
Nevertheless, the two cases leave little doubt that something more
is needed. Whether a corporation would be a bank if its depositors
could draw checks upon it is not at all certain, but it is clear at
least that no corporation whose depositors could not draw upon it
by check has ever been held a bank within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
While the decisions offer some information on the sine qua non
of banking-there must be deposits and these probably must be sub-
ject to withdrawal by check-they give little help on the extent to
which non-banking activities carried on in conjunction with a
banking business will prevent a finding that the debtor is a bank.
The failure of Clemons v. Liberty Savings & Real Estate Corp. to
rest its holding that the debtor was not a bank in part on the
ground that it had too many non-banking powers barely tends to
indicate that, if the essential elements of banking are present, a
corporation can have a good many auxiliary powers or activities
and still be a bank. And it has been held that a corporation engaged
in banking does not lose its exempt status by also carrying on the
business of a trust company.84 Beyond that the bankruptcy courts
have been spared the problem of characterizing a corporation en-
gaged in banking and other lines of endeavor.
Banking has been defined in many contexts outside of bank-
82. Ibid.
83. ".A clear preponderance of the evidence shows that appellee did no
banking business other than receiving savings accounts, for which they issued
either pass books or certificates of deposit; that the depositors on the pass
books were permitted to draw out portions of the deposit from time to time
on checks. This it could not do under its charter.... If it occasionally engaged
in banking transactions, those acts were ultra vires and could not operate to
make it a bank within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Law... " Ibid.
84. Woolsey v. Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Kansas
ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, 62 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1932).
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ruptcy, and some of these definitions are occasionally referred to by
bankruptcy courts. The usual caveat about importing definitions
established in one area into an unrelated field is obviously applicable.
That a department store may be deemed for purposes of state law
to be unlawfully engaged in banking if it permits its customers to
deposit money to be drawn upon for future purchases does not mean
that such a store would be a banking corporation within the meaning
of the Bankruptcy Act."' Nor is a definition established for a term
in a revenue statute much help in applying a bankruptcy statute. In
any event, the general definitions customarily offered have little re-
solving power in a close bankruptcy case. One example should
suffice:
Strictly speaking, the term bank implies a place for the deposit
of money, as that is the most obvious purpose of such an institu-
tion. Originally the business of banking consisted only in re-
ceiving deposits, such as bullion, plate, and the like for safe-
keeping, until the depositor should see fit to draw it out for use,
but the business... was extended, and bankers assumed to dis-
count bills and notes and to loan money upon mortgage, bond,
or other security, and at a still later period to issue notes of their
own intended as a circulating currency and a medium of
exchange.... Modern bankers frequently exercise any two or
even all three of those functions, but it is still true that an
institution prohibited from exercising any more than one of
those functions is a bank in the strictest commercial sense.,,
b. Insarance Corporations.
Whereas the banking corporation cases occasionally postulate a
definition of banking and then see whether the debtor fits, the
insurance corporation cases typically avoid any attempt at a general
definition of insurance. The decisions which characterize an insur-
ance corporation independently of state classification can best be
discussed by considering the approaches they employ and how they
deal with certain activities.
One court has tackled the problem by asking: Would most
states have classified this corporation as an insurance corporation
at the time the exclusion of insurance corporations was adopted ?s
85. See Meserole Securities Co. v. Cosmon, 253 N.Y. 130, 136, 170 N.E.
519, 521 (1930).
86. Kansas ex rel. Boynton v. Hayes, 62 F.2d 597, 600 (10th Cir. 1932),
quoting Oulton v. Savings Institution, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 109, 118 (1872),
a tax case.
87. See Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442, 451 (4th Cir. 1942),
aff'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943), in which the debtor had been selling annunities
and had, shortly before it attempted bankruptcy reorganization, begun selling
life insurance; the court pointed out that the business of the debtor was such
that it "would have been classed as an insurance company under the laws
of the majority of the states as they existed in 1910.... At that time, the laws
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To the extent that this inquiry is premised on the common judicial
assumption that Congress' primary purpose was to leave liquidation
of an insurance corporation to the same authority that regulated
it during its life, the inquiry is only a variant of the state classifica-
tion test. Such an inquiry might be justified, however, without
reference to any assumption about legislative intent, on the theory
that Congress' understanding in 1910 of the meaning of insurance
must be discovered in contemporaneous legal usage, and the usage
of state legislators, officials and judges is the best available evidence
of that. Even on this theory, though, the inquiry is open to the
objection that it freezes the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act as of
1910 regardless of changes in business conditions and regulatory
practices. If the actions of the states are to be looked to for help in
fashioning a bankruptcy definition of insurance corporation, it would
be better to find out what they are doing currently.
The best reasoned approach to the problem is probably still In
re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity,8 now presumably over-
ruled. The Supreme Lodge had been issuing certificates "in nearly
all the forms of modern life and accident insurance, to persons se-
lected and chosen under the usual standards of insurance regula-
tions, with premiums calculated and fixed by insurance rules."8' 9
The court said:
No reasons for making these exceptions were assigned by the
committees of Congress, but they may be surmised to lie in the
public or quasi public nature of the business, involving other
interests than those of creditors, in the desirability of unarrested
operation, the completeness of state regulation, including provi-
sions for insolvency, and the inappropriateness of the bank-
ruptcy machinery to their affairs .... The affairs of an embar-
rassed or insolvent insurance company often require much tech-
nical skill and judgment and time for their adjustment and a
carrying forward of the business, to prevent lapses and to permit
reinsurance to simplify them. And considering the variety of
insurance obligations assumed and the various statuses thereof,
a chief practical difficulty is the ascertainment of who are really
to be considered creditors and in what amounts, often requiring
much time and elaborate accounting for its solution. Under such
of tventy-eight states . . . classified a life insurance company as a corpora-
tion formed to insure the lives of persons and to grant, purchase and dispose
of annuities. . . ." This approach is not confined to insurance cases. See
Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 281 U.S. 705,
cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848 (1930).
88. 286 Fed. 180 (N.D. Ga. 1923), presumably overruled insofar as it
relies on independent characterization by Republic Underwriters v. Ford,
100 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1938), and Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. McKee,
95 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1938).
89. 286 Fed. at 187.
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circumstances even the election of a trustee in bankruptcy would
be difficult, and a creditors' meeting could hardly prosecute any
business, owing to conflicting interests of the various classes of
claims.
All these reasons apply with full force to a modern fraternal ben-
efit insurance organization, and argue the inclusion of corpora-
tions doing such business within the broad terms used by
Congress."
The court thus considered the drawbacks of bankruptcy liquidation
for insurance corporations and soundly concluded that since those
same drawbacks would be applicable to the debtor it should be held
an insurance corporation. Some of the disadvantages mentioned in
the opinion undoubtedly ended with the adoption of comprehensive
procedures for corporate reorganization, but those that do remain
would still be as applicable to the Supreme Lodge of the Masons
Annuity as to any conceded insurance corporation.
The status of fraternal benevolent orders under the insurance
corporation exclusion has come before bankruptcy courts on a num-
ber of occasions. In re Suprethe Lodge of the Masons Annuity is
very nearly alone in regarding such an organization as an insurance
corporation. 91 The powers and activites of such organizations may,
of course, vary substantially from one fraternal order to another.
Contrast, for example, the operations of the Supreme Lodge of the
Masons Annuity with this description of the debtor in In re Grand
Lodge A.O.U.W.:
The bankrupt is not, in my opinion, an insurance corporation
within the meaning of the bankrupt law. As a matter of fact it
did not insure. Its only obligation was to collect, from such of
its members as were willing to contribute, funds with which, if
and when collected, it would pay certain amounts to the benefi-
ciaries of deceased members. There was not other obligation
on the bankrupt than that of a collector. There was no obli-
90. Id. at 184.
91. Square holdings on the question whether a fraternal order is an
insurance corporation are rare because involuntary proceedings must be
dismissed if the debtor is either an insurance corporation or is not moneyed,
business or commercial. Thus, In re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity,
286 Fed. 180, 188 (N.D. Ga. 1923), concludes: "According to its charter,
therefore, [the debtor] is a benevolent, and not a business or moneyed, corpo-
ration. According to its principal object and business at the time of its failure,
it was an insurance corporation. Under either view of it, it is not subject to
involuntary bankruptcy." Notwithstanding this kind of hedging, it is rather
clear that almost all courts which have considered whether a fraternal
benevolent order is eligible for bankruptcy have viewed such organizations as
something other than insurance corporations. See,e.g., Hoile v. Unity Life
Ins. Co., 136 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1943). Additional authorities on this subject
are collected in Annot., 148 A.L.R. 714 (1944).
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gation on the part of any of the members to pay unless they were
willing to do so .... This is not insurance. 2
The variety of fraternal orders should make the approach exempli-
fied by In re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity extremely
attractive and yet it has been stated that,
[C]orporations of this character had been in existence very
many years at the time of the enactment of the bankrupt law,
and of the provision excepting insurance corporations from its
benefits, and were technically known as fraternal benevolent
societies or associations, and not as insurance corporations. If
Congress intended to place them among the excepted corpora-
tions, there was a well-known name by which they could have
been designated.93
The answer, of course, is that Congress did not wish to except all
fraternal benefit societies from bankruptcy; it wished to exclude
only those which were insurance corporations.
Since fraternal benefit societies normally engage in a number of
activities in addition to providing death and disability benefits, we
might expect the cases involving those societies to consider whether
non-insurance functions carried on in conjunction with an insurance
business will prevent a debtor from being held an insurance corpo-
ration, but the problem is never approached in these terms. Never-
theless, it may be that the courts which have held such societies not
to be insurance corporations were influenced to some extent by their
non-insurance activities. If the question had been expressly put to
the court that decided In re Supreme Lodge of the Masons Annuity,
it might well have said that no amount of auxiliary activity could
remove the disadvantages of bankruptcy administration for this
debtor, and it should, therefore, be deemed an insurance corpora-
tion. The question was expressly considered in In re New York
Title & Mortgage Co.,94 a case involving a guaranteed mortgage
company, but gave little difficulty because the court characterized
the overwhelming proportion of the debtor's business as insurance.
In sum, the insurance cases on this problem provide no more infor-
mation than the banking cases.
Another business that has presented the problem of insurance
corporation or not on several occasions is the guaranteed mortgage
company. Only two cases essay an independent characterization of
such an enterprise, and they reach opposite conclusions,95 which
92. 232 Fed. 199 (N.D. Cal. 1916).
93. Id. at 200.
94. 9 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. N.Y. 1934).
95. In re Prudence Co., 79 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S.
646 (1935), indicated that independent characterization of the guaranteed
mortgage company before it would accord with the state's classification of the
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may help to explain the enthusiasm for the state classification test
manifested by the circuit in which they arose.
The last approach to be found in the cases is the inevitable reli-
ance on insurance decisions in other contexts. For example,
[T]he record puts this case in close analogy with U. S. v. Home
Title Insurance Company... in which the Supreme Court held
that the company was an insurance corporation within the mean-
ing of the tax law and that the tax law used the term "insur-
ance company" in its ordinary sense. So it must be held here."
c. Building and Loan Associations.
Few cases have been concerned with the meaning of building
and loan association since that type of corporation was added to the
list of section 4 exclusions twenty-five years ago. None gives much
aid in defining building and loan association independently of state
classification. Clemons v. Liberty Savings & Real Estate Corpora-
tion"f presented a fact situation that offered an opportunity for help-
ful analysis, but counsel apparently contended that the debtor was
a building and loan association for the first time in argument before
the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the contention briefly, con-
cluding that, "It is evident that appellee was organized to do a gen-
eral savings and loan business, something less than either a bank
or a building and loan association."98
This conclusion is curious because "savings and loan associa-
tion" is generally regarded as a synonym for "building and loan
association."9 9 The court was apparently using the phrase, "savings
debtor as something other than an insurance corporation. it re New York
Title & Mortgage Co., 9 F. Supp. 319 (N.D. N.Y. 1934), held the business
of selling guaranteed mortgages to be insurance. To the extent that In re
New York Title & Mortgage Co. relies on independent characterization, it is
presumably overruled by In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 75 F.2d
984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935), in which a guaranteed mort-
gage company was held an insurance corporation solely on the basis of state
classification. Union Guarantee & Mortgage was followed in In re National
Mortgage Corp., 17 F. Supp. 54 (D. N.J. 1935). To the extent that inde-
pendent characterization resulted in a finding of insurance in In re New York
Title & Mortgage Co., it is presumably overruled by the Prudence case's
indication that the guaranteed mortgage business cannot be characterized
as insurance.
96. In re New York Title & Mortgage Co., supra note 95, at 325.
97. 61 F.2d 448 (5th Cir. 1932).
98. Id. at 450.
99. See, e.g., Cal. Fin. Code Ann. § 5025 (West Supp. 1956) ("When-
ever in the laws of this State the words 'Building and Loan Association Law,'
'Division of Building and Loan,' 'Building and Loan Commissioner,' 'Building
and Loan Inspection Fund,' 'building and loan association,' and 'building and
loan business' appear, they shall mean 'Savings and Loan Association Law,'
'Division of Savings and Loan,' 'Savings and Loan Commissioner,' 'Savings
and Loan Inspection Fund,' 'savings and loan association,' and 'savings and
loan business,' respectively.") ; Russell, Savings and Loan Associations c. 3
(1956).
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and loan business," not in any technical sense, but merely to refer
to some kind of limbo into which it would consign corporations
which receive deposits but which do not meet the qualifications of a
bank or building and loan association.110 We are not told, though,
nor are sufficient facts set forth to infer, what essential character-
istic of a building and loan association was missing from the debtor's
makeup.
In the absence of any helpful case authority, it may be worth-
while to speculate on what characteristics are likely to be regarded
as essential to a building and loan association. The history of build-
ing and loan associations, now more commonly known as savings
and loan associations, indicates that these terms have always been
used to refer to a corporation that is both a savings and home financ-
ing institution.10 1 The form of the savings contract may vary - the
saver is sometimes referred to as a shareholder; his funds may be
available on demand or only on notice -but in essence the rela-
tionship is similar to that of a depositor to a savings bank.10 2 The
funds on deposit with a building and loan association are used pri-
marily for first mortgage loans on private homes.103 Perhaps a cor-
poration would be held a building and loan association if home
mortgage loans made up less than a substantial majority of its port-
folio, but probably not unless home financing was at least the com-
pany's predominant investment outlet.
Several other characteristics are quite common among corpora-
tions calling themselves building and loan associations, but do not
seem indispensable. While most building and loan associations are
mutual organizations, 04 a corporation engaging in the requisite
savings and investment activities would probably be held a building
and loan association even though it issued capital stock. 05 Similar-
ly, the fact that building and loan associations typically lend only to
their members would not prevent a corporation pursuing a different
practice from being held a building and loan association. This dis-
100. The court's use of the phrase was apparently prompted by the use
of the same phrase in Ga. Code Ann. § 16-101 (1935) in an equally vague way.
101. See Russell, op cit. supra note 99, cc. 1-3; Sundheim, Law of
Building and Loan Associations 10 (3d ed. 1933) ; Federal Home Loan Bank
Bd. Ann. Rep. 45 (1955).
102. See Russell, op. cit. supra note 99, c. 18; Comment, Rights of De-
positors and Borrowers upon Insolvency of Building and Loan Associations,
42 Yale L. J. 931, 936 (1933).
103. See Russell, op. cit. supra note 99, at 10; Federal Home Loan Bank
Bd. Ann. Rep. 36, 45 (1955).
104. See Russell, op. cit. supra note 99, at 2; Federal Home Loan Bank
Bd. Ann. Rep. 34 (1955).
105. Security Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Spurlock, 65 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 678 (1933).
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tinction may have been impoi-tant once, but it probably persists only
because of certain tax advantages accruing to associations which so
limit their lending,108 and, in fact, is now only a meaningless for-
mality. For example, the charters of federal savings and loan asso-
ciations customarily provide that all borrowers automatically be-
come members, and some state associations have similar provi-
sions.117 Another common but not indispensable characteristic is
local operation; because of the nature of their lending activities,
building and loan associations can apparently police their securi-
ties more efficiently if they operate only within the community in
which they are located.'08 Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that a
corporation would cease to be a building and loan association by
doing business in a wider area.
2. Activities Differing from Powers.
If the activities of a corporation differ in some respect from the
powers conferred by its charter, a bankruptcy court undertaking to
determine, independently of state classification, whether that corpo-
ration is excluded from bankruptcy may have to decide whether the
corporation's powers or activities, or some combination of these,
should control. Gamble v. Daniel0 9 presented one aspect of this
problem. There the debtor's activities apparently would have classi-
fied it as a bank, but it lacked an essential banking power. The
court held that corporate powers should control, saying:
First, it would be strange if Congress would permit the classifi-
cation under section 4 (and, therefore, the application of the
entire Act) to be controlled by the exercise of ultra vires powers
by a corporation. Second, a comparison of the Amendment of
1910 (the present section) with similar sections in previous
bankruptcy legislation shows a deliberate departure from the
106. For example, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 591 provides that, "In the
case of mutual savings banks, cooperative banks, and domestic building and
loan associations, there shall be allowed as deductions in computing taxable
income amounts paid to, or credited to the accounts of, depositors or holders
of accounts as dividends on their deposits or withdrawable accounts, if such
amounts paid or credited are withdrawable on demand subject only to cus-
tomary notice of intention to withdraw." "Domestic building and loan asso-
ciation" is defined by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 7701(19) as "a domestic
building and loan association, a domestic savings and loan association, and a
Federal savings and loan association, substantially all the business of which
is confined to making loans to members." (Italics supplied.)
107. See Russell, op. cit. supra note 99, c. 21 and authorities there cited.
When the act of borrowing does not itself confer membership, borrowers are
commonly admitted to membership before the loan is made, and this may
merely require the issuance of a membership certificate to the borrower.
See ibid.
108. See Russell, op. cit. supra note 99, at 2.
109. 39 F.2d 447 (8th Cir.), appeal disinissed, 281 U.S. 705, cert. denied,
282 U.S. 848 (1930).
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"business carried on" criterion. Third, the reason for the amend-
ment of section 4, in 1910 was stated by its author to be to es-
cape the confusion which had arisen in decisions as to construc-
tion and application of the words "engaged principally" in the
1898 act .... It was to escape this confusion and uncertainty
that the amendment "adopted the scientific way of declaring a
class and then stating exceptions to the class." Cong. Rec. vol.
45 p. 2275. We have no doubt that when Congress used the
words "banking corporations" it meant corporations which
were authorized by the laws of their creation to do a banking
business. 10
Is it true, as the court argues in its second and third points, that
the legislative history of section 4 compels the conclusion that
Congress intended a corporation's powers, rather than its activities,
to control? That section 4 was once phrased in terms of the business
principally engaged in, and is no longer so phrased, is indisputable.
So is the fact that the legislative history shows that there was con-
cern over the confusion caused by the language used prior to 1910.
But it is not at all clear that Congress' remedy was to make the
powers of a corporation the governing criterion. As we have seen,
a number of courts believe that Congress' answer was to make state
classification controlling. The legislative history reveals that the
author's remedy for the confusion was not to make powers the test
-nothing was said about corporate powers-but to abandon the
enumeration of corporations subject to bankruptcy and adopt "the
scientific way" of declaring that all corporations are subject to bank-
ruptcy, with certain specified exceptions."1
The court's first point is hardly persuasive when we remember
that ultra vires action by a corporation often has legal consequences.
The question to be answered in Gamble v. Daniel was whether ultra
vires activity should be sufficient to bring a corporation within one
110. Id. at 450.
111. This explanation was given on the floor of the House: "My next
amendment undertakes to make a scientific classification of those who may
be put into involuntary bankruptcy. As the bill was originally drawn, an
effort was made to name in detail those individuals who were amenable to
the law. Instead of stating the rule and then naming the exception, they
simply reversed it, so that I provide that any 'moneyed, business, or com-
mercial corporations, excepting municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking
corporations, may be put into involuntary bankruptcy.'
"The old law provided that 'a corporation engaged principally in manu-
facturing, trading, printing, publishing, mining, or mercantile pursuits' could
be put in bankruptcy, and the question then came up in the court as to what
was meant by the word 'principally,' and you have some very strange deci-
sions.... So, instead of having them enumerated, I have adopted the scientific
way of declaring a class and then stating the exceptions to the class." 45 Cong.
Rec. 2275 (1910) ; see H.R. Rep. No. 511, Ser. No. 5591, 61st Cong., 2d Sess.
4 (1910), fully quoted in Sen. Rep. No. 691, Ser. No. 5584, 61st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4 (1910).
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of the section 4 exclusions, and the court's first point merely as-
sumes the answer. We submit that it assumes the wrong answer.
Whatever reasons Congress may have had for deeming bankruptcy
inappropriate for the corporations excluded by section 4, surely
Congress' primary concern was not for the excluded corporations
themselves, but for those dealing with them, those who buy insur-
ance and those who deposit funds with banks and building and loan
associations. And whether or not there are such people who will
be adversely affected by bankruptcy administration depends not on
what the corporation is empowered to do, but on what it is actually
doing. Consequently, a bankruptcy court should not refuse to hold
a corporation a bank merely because its banking activity is ultra
vires.
No case has presented the converse of the problem presented by
Gamble v. Daniel; that is, what result when a debtor is empowered
to engage in, say, banking, but instead of exercising that power is
engaged in ultra vires activity which would make it subject to bank-
ruptcy? While this question was not posed by Gamble v. Daniel,
some of the court's language would resolve this question too by ref-
erence to the debtor's powers rather than activities. In addition to
the discussion already quoted, the court says, "The most natural
meaning of the words is: A corporation empowered to do a banking
business. ' ' 112 Our criticism of the reference to powers in the Gamble
v. Daniel situation is also applicable here. That is to say, if a corpo-
ration empowered to do a banking business is not engaged in bank-
ing, the interests Congress sought to protect by excluding banks
from bankruptcy need no protection, and the debtor should be held
subject to the Bankruptcy Act.
The need to choose between powers and activities is not confined
to cases in which a debtor is engaged in ultra vires activity; it may
be present when a corporation exercises less than all of its charter
powers. The Eighth Circuit noted half the problem in Gamble v.
Daniel: "Whether a corporation empowered to do a banking busi-
ness and also other character of business, but actually doing no
banking business is included, we need not determine, as that situa-
tion is not present here."'11 The court didn't bother to raise the
question of the corporation empowered to do banking and other
business, but which does only banking. While there are no holdings
on the latter question, such a corporation would probably be exempt
from bankruptcy. Nor is there much authority on the question
112. 39 F.2d at 450.
113. Ibid.
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raised and left unanswered in Gamble v. Daniel. In re Supreme
Lodge of the Masons Annuity seems to support an activities test:
[A] corporation often has power to do many things. . . . So
many corporations are chartered both as banks and trust com-
panies. Surely whether such a one was actually doing a bank-
ing business could be inquired into, if it was sought to be put in
bankruptcy .... The true rule is that the charter is first to be
looked to in classifying the corporation, but that the business
really done ... may also be looked to either to explain or rebut
the inferences from the charter powers.
114
A number of cases, without attempting to discriminate among the
various ways in which the powers-activities choice may be presented,
state that powers control." 5 Whether these statements were intend-
ed to apply to anything more than the ultra vires situation is not
clear. In any event, there is no more reason to pass over activities
in favor of powers in a multiple powers case than there is in an ultra
vires case.
In sum, regardless of whether a bankruptcy court must choose
between powers and activities because a debtor is engaged in ultra
vires activity or because a debtor has more powers than it uses, if
the corporation is to be characterized independently of state classi-
fication, that characterization should refer to the debtor's activities
rather than its powers.""
114. 286 Fed. 180, 183 (N.D. Ga. 1923). The district court which decided
In re Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 42 F.Supp. 973 (S.D. W.Va. 1941), thought the
debtor was empowered to engage in insurance and other business but was
carrying on only the other business. It disposed of the question this way: "In
deciding whether a corporation is to be classified as an insurance or banking
corporation or a building and loan association within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act, the court must first examine the provisions of its corporate
charter. If the charter authorizes the company to engage in business in any of
the excepted fields, and if the company in fact engages principally in a busi-
ness which lies within that field, such a corporation must be treated as one
excluded from the benefits of Chapter X. However, if its charter authorizes
the corporation to engage in activities outside the excepted fields, and if all
the business actually done by the corporation is outside those fields, then it
must be treated as not being within any of the excluded classes. By this
test debtor must be classified as a corporation which is not an insurance
corporation within the meaning of ... the Bankruptcy Act." Id at 982. The
Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's view of the facts and the
law and reversed. 129 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943).
115. E.g., In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., 75 F.2d 984, 985 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935) ; Clemons v. Liberty Savings & Real
Estate Corp., 61 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1932).
116. When an involuntary petition is filed against a corporation that has
been dissolved, the debtor's activities at the time the petition is filed obviously
should not control. Since a dissolved corporation will normally be engaged
solely in winding up its affairs, permitting its activities at the time the
petition is filed to control would mean that all of the excepted corporations
would become eligible for bankruptcy as soon as they ceased doing business.
While this might produce desirable results, it hardly accords with Congress'
purpose. See note 36 supra. The solution would seem to be a reference to
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C. Is State Classification Preferable to Independent Characteriza-
tion by Bankruptcy Courts?
A court often decides difficult questions of statutory interpreta-
tion in the light of the policy underlying the statute, but the policy
underlying the exclusion from bankruptcy of a few types of corpo-
ration is not clear. If we accept the common judicial rationale that
Congress' purpose was to leave the insolvency administration of
strictly regulated enterprises to the state which regulates them, the
sound approach would be to resolve all close cases in favor of exclu-
sion from bankruptcy if the corporation is strictly regulated, and
against exclusion in the absence of strict regulation. Probably most
close cases would then be resolved in favor of exclusion. On the
other hand, since the exclusions were originally adopted, Congress
has expanded the Bankruptcy Act to provide for rehabilitation of
stricken corporations. If this machinery would be helpful to a partic-
ular debtor, perhaps the approach should be to narrow the definition
of the exclusion at issue and thus make the beneficience of reorgan-
ization available to as many debtors as possible.
The absence of a clear policy to be effectuated by the exclusions
means that the choice between state classfication and independent
characterization must be made on some other basis. We have seen
that the state classification test offers predictability and that predict-
ability is important in this area. L7 Arguing against state classifica-
tion is the minor disadvantage that it fails to yield uniform treat-
ment of corporations that are essentially the same if their home
states classify them differently. This would not, however, be the
only instance in which the Bankruptcy Act permits similarly situ-
ated debtors to be treated differently because of applicable state
law," 3l and, of course, such corporations are treated differently all
through their lives because of differences in the laws of the states
which govern them. This additional difference in treatment hardly
rises to the level of injustice. More serious is the possibility, espe-
cially likely with respect to insurance corporations, that the state
of incorporation is not the state with the greatest interest in decid-
ing how an enterprise should be liquidated or rehabilitated. If a
company does most of its business outside of its state of incorpora-
tion, the arbitrary nature of a reference to that state's classification
becomes most patent and abdication by a bankruptcy court to that
the debtor's activities immediately before disolution or at the time the act
of bankruptcy was committed. Cf. Bankruptcy Act § 4b: "The status of an
alleged bankrupt as a wage earner or farmer shall be determined as of the time
of the commission of the act of bankruptcy."
117. See text following note 63 supra.
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state's decision most questionable. Even in such a case, though, the
state of incorporation is not entirely without interest in what be-
comes of the beleaguered corporation. Furthermore, a court accept-
ing the state classification test still retains the residual power to ig-
nore a state classification which it regards as unreasonable." 9
The disadvantages of the state classification test do not attend
independent characterization by bankruptcy courts, but neither does
the advantage - predictability - for the attempts at independent
characterization have not been very enlightening. We know little
more about banks than that there can be no banking corporation in
the absence of power to receive deposits.1 2 Fraternal benefit socie-
ties are generally not treated as insurance corporations, but beyond
that the meaning of insurance corporation for bankruptcy purposes
remains unclear. We can only guess about how building and loan
association will be defined. And, finally, the powers-activities prob-
lem has not been satisfactorily resolved.
Given the unsatisfactory results of independent characterization,
the attraction of the state classification test is readily understanda-
ble. Nor should it surprise that the attraction appears to be strong-
est in the insurance cases, where the courts have had most difficulty
with an independent definition, and weakest in the banking cases,
where independent characterization has been least troublesome.1-2
118. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act § 6, 30 Stat 548 (1898), as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 24 (1952) ("This title shall not affect the allowance to bankrupts
of the exemptions which are prescribed by the laws of the United States or by
the State laws in force at the time of the filing of the petition in the State
wherein they have had their domicile for the six months immediately pre-
ceding the filing of the petition. . . .") ; Bankruptcy Act § 70(e), 30 Stat.
565 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(e) (1952) ("(1) A transfer made
or suffered or obligation incurred by a debtor adjudged a bankrupt under
this title which, under any Federal or State law applicable thereto, is fraudu-
lent as against or voidable for any other reason by any creditor of the debtor,
having a claim provable under this title, shall be null and void as against the
trustee of such debtor.").
119. See Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442, 451 (4th Cir.
1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943): "These authorities establish the rule that
in determining whether a corporate debtor is a member of the excepted
classes, the provisions of the state law must be given predominating influence.
This is not to say that the classification of a state statute must be followed
literally in every instance without any regard whatsoever to the real activity
of the corporate body."
120. The emphasis on deposits cannot be justified in terms of any policy
objective of the Bankruptcy Act, but may be explicable, like the attraction
of the state classification test, in terms of predictability and judicial apprecia-
tion of a standard that is easy to apply.
121. Compare Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442 (4th Cir.
1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943); Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. Mc-
Kee, 95 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1938); it re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co.,
75 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935), with Woolsey v.
Security Trust Co., 74 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1934) ; Kansas ex rel. Boynton v.
Hayes, 62 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1932) ; Gamble v. Daniel, 39 F.2d 447 (8th
Cir.), appeal dismissed, 281 U.S. 705, cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848 (1930).
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In fact, whatever the powers or activities of a debtor, it is hard to
conceive of a bankruptcy court departing from state classification
when the issue is insurance corporation or not,122 whereas, whatever
the classification of the state of incorporation, it seems unlikely that
a corporation will be held a bank if it lacks the power to receive
deposits.123 However, a caveat on the banking cases is in order:
while they all reflect great reliance on the deposit criterion, they all
contain, too, at least a token reference to state classification, and
the tendency of the courts to cite banking, building and loan asso-
ciationU'2 and insurance decisions indiscriminately when support for
122. A review of the current state of the authorities in the circuits re-
veals the following: The Second Circuit unequivocally espoused state classi-
fication in In re Union Guarantee & Mortgage Co., supra note 121, and while
it retreated somewhat from that strong commitment in In re Pruderce Co.,
79 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935), it did so primarily
with respect to banks and not insurance corporations. An early Third Circuit
decision, In re Order of Sparta, 242 Fed. 235 (3d Cir. 1917), relied principally
on independent characterization, but the court may not have needed to decide
whether the debtor was an insurance corporation in order to decide the case
before it. In any event, a later decision by one of the district courts in that
circuit relied entirely on state classification without even citing the Sparta
case. In re Nat'l Mortgage Corp., 17 F. Supp. 54 (D. N.J. 1935). The Fourth
Circuit relied primarily on state classification in Sims v. Fidelity Assur.
Ass'n, supra note 121, and reaffirmed that view in Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co.,
136 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1943). The Fifth Circuit relied almost entirely on state
classification in Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v. McKee, supra note 121,
and reaffirmed that view in Republic Underwriters v. Ford, 100 F.2d 511 (5th
Cir. 1938). Giving the problem very brief treatment, the Sixth Circuit seems
to have relied on both state classification and independent characterization in
Capital Endowment Co. v. Kroeger, 86 F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1936). There are
no decisions dealing with the definition of the total exclusions of section 4
in the First Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, and the Eighth and
Tenth Circuits have only faced the problem in the banking context, where
independent characterization is more significant. The Ninth Circuit has
not had to define an insurance corporation, but it relied almost entirely on
state classification in a building and loan association case, Security Bldg. &
Loan Ass'n v. Spurlock, 65 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 678
(1933). A later decision of one of the district courts in that circuit, how-
ever, relies on both state classification and independent characterization to
define a building and loan association. In re Pacific States Say. & Loan Co.,
27 F. Supp. 1009 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
123. Since no banking decision has considered its independent charac-
terization to be at variance with a state classification, the statement in the text
obviously cannot be supported by any holdings. Nevertheless, each of the cases
which refused to hold the corporation before it a bank stated without qualifica-
tion or clearly implied that the power to receive deposits is a sine qua non of
banking. In re Prudence Co., supra note 122; Clemons v. Liberty Savings &
Real Estate Corp., 61 F.2d 448, 450 (5th Cir. 1932) ; Gamble v. Daniel, 39
F.2d 447, 450 (8th Cir.), appeal dismissed, 281 U.S. 705, cert. denied, 282 U.S.
848 (1930) ; In re Bay Cities Guaranty Bldg.-Loan Ass'n, 48 F.2d 623, 624(S.D. Cal. 1931).
124. The state classification test seems to be favored in building and loan
association cases, but the authorities are too sparse to permit a definitive judg-
ment. Security Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Spurlock, 65 F.2d 768 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 290 U.S. 678 (1933), clearly favors state classification. Clemons v.
Liberty Savings & Real Estate Corp., supra note 123, favors independent
characterization, but has been cited by a later decision in the Fifth Circuit in
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the state classification test is desired may eventually cause state
classification to become the controlling principle for banking cases."2 5
In sum, the state classification test attains a desirable objective-,
predictability' 2q---and while it defines by essentially arbitrary means,
it sacrifices relatively little of other attainable goals, for if bank-
ruptcy courts reach unsound or confusing results when they charac-
terize independently of state classification, arbitrary treatment is as
likely to rseult from this method as from state classification. Never-
theless, that the section 4 exclusions must be defined by essentially
arbitrary means raises the question of the wisdom of those exclu-
sions. To that question we now turn.
III. SHouLD BANKING AND INSURANCE CORPORATIONS AND
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS BE EXCLUDED
FROM BANKRUPTCY?
The case for abandoning an exclusion from bankruptcy ulti-
mately must rest on a showing that insolvency of the excluded cor-
poration can be better dealt with under the Bankruptcy Act than
under existing arrangements. In considering the bankruptcy alter-
native to the existing arrangements for insolvent banks, insurance
corporations and building and loan associations, we need not, of
course, regard bankruptcy as did the members of Congress in 1910,
support of state classification.. See Grand Lodge, Knights of Pythias v.
McKee, 95 F2d 474, 476 (5th Cir. 1938). Capital Endowment v. Kroeger, 86
F.2d 976 (6th Cir. 1936), and It re Pacific States Say. & Loan Co., 27 F.
Supp. 1009 (S.D. Cal. 1939), seem to rely on both state classification and in-
dependent characterization.
125. This caveat would appear to be especially appropriate with respect
to the Fourth Circuit which has strongly committed itself to state classifica-
tion in insurance cases and has not yet been called upon to define a banking
corporation. However, the Second Circuit, after taking the strongest possible
position in favor of state classification in it re Union Guarantee & Mortgage
Co., 75 F.2d 984 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 594 (1935), rested its hold-
ing that the Prudence Co. was not a bank in part on the fact that, "[T]he
debtor does not possess the power to receive deposits, which is generally rec-
ognized as the essential characteristic of a banking business." it re Prudence
Co., 79 F.2d 77, 79 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 646 (1935). Compare Re-
public Underwriters v. Ford, 100 F.2d 511 (5th Cir 1938), and Grand Lodge,
Knights of Pythias v. McKee, stpra note 124, with Woolsey v. Security Trust
Co., 74 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1934), and Clemons v. Liberty Savings & Real Es-
tate Corp., 61 F.2d 448( 5th Cir. 1932).
126. The state classification test also avoids the theoretical danger of a
corporation being left without any statutory way to liquidate or rehabilitate.
If the federal courts are characterizing independently of state classification, it
is conceivable that a debtor will be classified by a bankruptcy court as, for
example, an insurance corporation, but be regarded by its state of incorpora-
tion as something other than an insurance corporation. The debtor will then
be foreclosed both from bankruptcy and from the state of incorporation's pro-
cedures for insolvent insurance corporations. However, this will probably
never happen, and even if it does, devices such as the assignment for the ben-
efit of creditors and the equity receivership are still available.
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as primarily a liquidation device. Not only does the Bankruptcy
Act now contain two different procedures for rehabilitating corpo-
rations in general, 27 but it also contains chapters setting up special
procedures for particular corporations which cannot soundly be
treated under the more general chapters. 28 Nor is sole control over
the outcome of the proceeding always in the hands of the bankruptcy
court; in some situations the advice or consent of federal or state
administrative officials may play a crucial part. 2 9 Today, then, the
alternatives to state control over the liquidation or rehabilitation of
the excluded corporations are numerous. These corporations could
be made eligible for both liquidation and rehabilitation under the
general provisions of the Bankruptcy Act; their eligibility could be
limited to the general reorganization provisions; or separate chap-
ters could be enacted to deal specifically with the special problems
of each of them. Any of these courses could be coupled with a re-
quirement that the advice or consent of the administrators charged
with the supervision of these corporations during their lives be ob-
tained before final disposition. In short, anything that can be done
outside of the Bankruptcy Act to deal with insolvency of the ex-
cluded corporations can probably now be done under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.
Is there anything that can be done under the Bankruptcy Act
that cannot be done outside of it? Since the Bankruptcy Act has
grown from a statute dealing with liquidation into what is really and
agglomeration of statutes dealing with insolvency in many ways,
this question really asks whether anything can be achieved by fed-
eral legislation that the states cannot achieve themselves. It does
not require a comprehensive review of the provisions and adminis-
127. See Bankruptcy Act §§ 101-276, 301-399, 52 Stat. 883, 905 (1938),
11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676, 701-799 (1952).
128. See note 2 mtpra.
129. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §§ 177, 178, 52 Stat. 891 (1938), 11
U.S.C. §§ 577, 578 (1952):
§ 577. Approval of plan for public utility.
In case a debtor is a public-utility corporation, subject to the jurisdiction
of a commission having regulatory jurisdiction over the the debtor, a plan
shall not be approved,... until -(1) it shall have been submitted to each such commission;
(2) an opportunity shall have been afforded each such commission to
suggest amendments or offer objections to the plan; and(3) the judge shall have considered such amendments or objections at a
hearing at which such commission may be heard.§ 578. Same; intrastate public utility.
* In case a debtor is a public-utility corporation, wholly intrastate, subject
to the jurisdiction of a State commission having regulatory jurisdiction over
such debtor, a plan shall not be approved ... unless such State commission
shall have first certified its approval of such plan as to the public interest
therein and the fairness thereof....
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tration of state legislation dealing with the liquidation and rehabili-
tation of banks, insurance companies and building and loan associa-
tions to see that the limitations of our federal system do make it ex-
tremely difficult for individual states to solve all of the problems
posed by the financial failure of the excluded corporations.
A. Insurance Corporations.
The difficulties with respect to insurance corporations are suffi-
ciently well catalogued in the Commissioners' Prefatory Note to the
Uniform Insurers Liquidation Act to justify quotation at length.
[I]nsurance company assets take the form, for the most part, of
special deposits required by state law, balances in the hands of
insurance agents, policy premiums due but unpaid, and invest-
ments of reserve funds. The greater number of these assets nat-
urally have their situs in the state of domicile of the company,
but a substantial portion is normally scattered over the entire
territory within which the company carries on its business. This
is necessarily true of the special deposits required by the laws of
non-domiciliary states and the balances in the hands of non-
resident agents. On the other side of the balance sheet the liabili-
ties of insurance companies, consisting primarily of policy obli-
gations, are also distributed over the several states in which the
companies do business. This wide distribution of assets and lia-
bilities creates a formidable array of problems when liquidation,
rehabilitation or reorganization proceedings becomes necessary
for an insurer which has drifted into financial difficulties. The
equitable and expeditious solution of these problems is rendered
the more difficult by wide differences in the provisions of the
statutes of the several states regarding such matters as special
deposits, preferred claims, securities, set-off, and the adminis-
trative and judicial procedures to be followed.... .
Specific features of insurer delinquency proceedings causing the
greatest embarrassment are the following:
1. In some states the statutes provide that the Insurance Com-
missioner shall serve as receiver; in others, the courts appoint
receivers as their discretion dictates. In the latter states experi-
ence has shown that efficient administration is less likely to ensue.
2. Very frequently the domiciliary receivers, whether or not
deemed statutory successors to the defunct companies, have but
little authority in nondomiciliary states, and in some states they
receive no recognition whatsoever. As a consequence, company
assets located outside the home states are likely to be dissipated,
and, unless ancillary proceedings are started, debtors living in
such states are all too frequently able to avoid meeting their
just obligations.
3. There is much confusion in the law concerning the title and
right to possession of the property of a defunct nonresident in-
surance company. In some states the title and the right to pos-
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
session are recognized as reposing in the domiciliary receiver;
in others, they are in the ancillary receiver. The absence of clear
definition of the law as to these matters hampers effective ad-
ministration.
4. Serious inconvenience in making proof of claims is experi-
enced by creditors who are so unfortunate as to live outside the
state of the defunct insurer's domicile. It frequently happens
that ancillary receivership proceedings are not commenced, or,
if commenced, the property in the hands of the ancillary receiver
is insufficient to meet the obligations of local creditors. As a
consequence, such creditors are forced to bear the expense, an-
noyance, and hardship of proceeding in the courts of the domi-
cile of the insurance company to prove their claims. Statutory
provisions which would make possible the proof of claims in the
states of creditors' residence would be a great boon.
5. Another difficulty arises from the diversity of state laws con-
cerning preferences, such as wage claims, compensation claims,
tax claims and the like. Administration would be simplified and
greater equity would be obtained if the laws of a single state,
preferably the state of domicile of the insurance company, were
made to govern all such preferences.
6. Finally, inequity often results from the fact that creditors in
nondomiciliary states may, if they are sufficiently well informed
and diligent, obtain preferences for themselves by commencing
attachment or similar proceedings against such property as may
be found in their respective states. Such proceedings can easily
be commenced by properly informed creditors before ancillary
proceedings are started, and as a result other less well-informed
creditors suffer accordingly. There is no just reason for permit-
ting such preferences to prevail. 130
While somewhat overstated,131 the Commissioners' summary of
130. 9A Uniform Laws Ann. 148. The difficulties of liquidating and re-
habilitating interstate insurance companies are also ably discussed in two
addresses. See Vance, Interstate Aspects of the Liquidation of Insolvent In-
surance Corporations, 6 Ass'n of Life Ins. Counsel 343 (1935) ; Van Schaick,
Interstate Liquidations-A National Problem, Proceedings of the National
Convention of Insurance Commissioners 99 (1933). Mr. Van Schaick's re-
marks are reprinted in 77 Cong. Rec. 5222 (1933) and in The Eastern Under-
writer, June 9, 1933, p. 23. For citation of authorities and further exposition
of some of the problems discussed by the Uniform Commissioners, see, e.g.,
Notes, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 1031 (1937), The Uniform Insurers Liquidation
Act, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 92 (1940), Some Problems in Liquidation and Reha-
bilitation of Inmrance Companies, 31 Va. L. Rev. 190 (1944), Insurance Liq-
uidations: A Proposed Amendment to the McCarran-Fcrguson Act, 66 Yale
L.J. 1072 (1957). For discussion going beyond the insurance context, see, e.g.,
Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 585-599 (3d ed. 1949) ; Cheatham, The Statutory
Successor, the Receiver and the Executor in Conflict of Laws, 44 Colum. L.
Rev. 549 (1944) ; Annot., 98 A.L.R. 351 (1935).
131. Many states are willing to accord extensive rights to a domiciliary
receiver, at least if the state of his appointment characterizes him as a statu-
tory successor, as is often the case with insurance company liquidators. See
Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 130, at 587; Cheatham, supra note 130, at 552.
Referring to statutory successors, section 161 of the Restatement, Conflict of
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the problems involved is essentially accurrate. Not surprisingly, the
response of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws was a uniform statute, the Uniform Insurers Liquida-
tion Act, which, if widely adopted, would undoubtedly go a long
way towards eliminating many of the difficulties of administering
multi-state insolvent insurance corporations. 1 32 Unfortunately, in
the eighteen years since the statute was promulgated, only sixteen
states have adopted it. 33 The nature of the uniform act and the
problems with which it was designed to deal make the failure of
two-thirds of the states to accept it particularly debilitating. Because
the statute is reciprocal, an adopting state will not apply it to assets
belonging to an insurance company whose state of incorporation
has not enacted it. 34 Furthermore, even if the state of incorporation
has adopted the uniform act, if any of the states in which the com-
pany owns assets has not, the statute is, of course, inapplicable to
those assets, and all the problems of the right of the domiciliary
liquidator to that property, preferences to attaching creditors from
it and the law governing the order of its distribution may still be
present.
The federal equity receivership may, on occasion, prove helpful,
but it, too, fails to provide anything like a complete answer. When
the managers of a corporation desire to have it reorganized, they
may arrange to have a friendly creditor of the corporation whose
claim exceeds $3,000 and whose citizenship differs from that of the
corporation seek the appointment of a receiver by a federal district
court. The creditor's bill will be rapidly followed by the corpora-
Laws (1934) states, "If a statute of the state of incorporation which is in
force at the time of the dissolution of a corporation provides that all its assets
shall, upon dissolution, pass to a person designated in the statute, the right of
such person to the personal property, wherever situated and whether tangible
or intangible, will be recognized and given effect by other states and the desig-
nated person can bring suit in any state upon claims due to the corporation."
The problem of preference by attachment is obviated, and was at the time
the Commissioners were writing, for property located in California by a stat-
ute empowering the insurance commissioner to avoid preferences, whether ob-
tained by attachment or otherwise, made shortly before his receivership. Cal.
Ins. Code Ann. § 1034 (West 1955), originally adopted in 1935. Consequently,
if ancillary proceedings are commenced with reasonable dispatch, an attach-
ment can be set aside.
132. This, of course, is not to say that the statute could not be improved
in several respects. For some constructive criticism, see Note, The Uniform
Insurers Liquidation Act, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 92 (1940).
133. These are Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, and Washington. See 9A Uni-
form Laws Ann. 46 (Supp. 1956). Colorado, although not listed in the table,
has adopted the act. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 72(18) (1)-(12) (Supp. 1955).
134. Martin v. General American Casualty Co., 226 La. 481, 76 So. 2d
537, 46 A.L.R.2d 1178 (1954).
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tion's answer admitting the allegations of the complaint and joining
in the prayer for relief.135 However, where the creditor's suit is
brought at the instigation of an unfriendly group, hoping perhaps
for liquidation of the corporation, the corporation is likely to contest
the suit, and when a corporation fights the appointment of a re-
ceiver, the creditor's bill will probably be dismissed if the creditor
is an unsecured simple contract creditor,13 6 and it may be dismissed
135. The adaptation of the federal equity receivership to corporate re-
organization and the shortcomings of this makeshift are fully discussed in,
e.g., 6 Collier, Bankruptcy § 0.04 (14th ed. 1943) ; Finletter, Principles of
Corporate Reorganization in Bankruptcy 1-18 (1937); Gerdes, Corporate
Reorganizations 22-63 (1936) ; Report of the Counsel to the Special Commit-
tee to the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate Receivership and
Bankruptcy Proceedings and Administration of Justice in United States
Courts, S. Doc. No. 268, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 19-28 (1936). The shortcomings
led to the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act's corporate reorganization provi-
sions. It is conceivable that the federal equity receivership could be adapted
to meet the needs of insolvent insurance corporations, but, as the text and
notes following indicate, this is not likely to occur.
136. In order to determine whether the action will be dismissed we must
discover first whether state or federal law controls. Pusey & Jones Co. v.
Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 (1923), held that a statute in the forum state permitting
an unsecured simple contract creditor to obtain a receiver of an insolvent
corporation over the corporation's objection did not affect the contrary federal
equity rule, because the state statute conferred "merely a remedy," and not "a
substantive right." Professor Moore argues persuasively that a repudiation of
this aspect of Pusey & Jones is demanded by the theory of Erie R.R. v. Tomp-
kins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the logic of the Supreme Court's decisions fol-
lowing it: hence where state law permits the appointment of a receiver, a
federal court sitting in a diversity case should do the same. See 2 Moore,
Federal Practice § 2.09 (2d ed. 1948). He concedes, however, that language
in the Court's opinion in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945),
"is susceptible of being interpreted as an endorsement of" this aspect of
Pusey & Jones, and a recent court of appeals decision has so interpreted it.
Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289, 292 (10th Cir. 1956) (dictum).
Consequently, until the Supreme Court gives us a definitive statement on the
subject, we cannot be certain that state law determines whether a receiver of
a corporation should be appointed in a diversity action brought by an unse-
cured simple contract creditor.
What, then, is the federal law on the subject? The leading statement
appears at p. 497 of Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, supra: "A receiver is
often appointed upon application of a secured creditor who fears that his
security will be wasted. .. .A receiver is often appointed upon application
of a judgment creditor who has exhausted his legal remedy. . . . But an un-
secured simple contract creditor has, in the absence of statute, no substantive
right, legal or equitable, in or to the property of his debtor .... He has no
right whatsoever in equity until he has exhausted his legal remedy .... The
objection that the bill does not make a case properly cognizable in a court
of equity does not go to its jurisdiction as a federal court .... [W]here the
defendant has expressly consented to action by the court or has failed to object
seasonably, the objection will be treated as waived... ." However, in Inland
Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, supra, a divided court permitted the appointment
of a receiver on application of an unsecured contract creditor over the objec-
tion of the corporation under these circumstances: "It is clear from the record
that the Company is hopelessly insolvent and must be liquidated. When dis-
aster came, it was doing business in twenty-one states, where its assets and
liabilities are to be found. The record shows that more than one and a half
million dollars is due the company from its agents in all of the states ....
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even if he holds security for or has recovered judgment on his
claim.13 7 Even if the corporation consents to the appointment of a
receiver or the situation is one in which a receiver would be ap-
The states of its domicile and principal place of business have freely conceded
their inability to rehabilitate or to liquidate for the best interest of the Com-
pany, its creditors, policyholders and stockholders. The trial court observed
that only six states in which the Company has been authorized to transact
business had adopted the uniform liquidation act for insurance companies, and
that the only alternative is independent receivership proceedings in each state
for the liquidation of the Company and the distribution of the assets. The
court said, and we agree, that it would be wholly impractical under existing
state laws to liquidate the Company by local receiverships in the various
states in which the defendant Company is doing business." 239 F.2d at 293.
If Inland Empire is followed, the federal equity rule will now be that a re-
ceiver of an insolvent corporation may be appointed on petition of an unse-
cured simple contract creditor over the objection of the corporation when
unusual circumstances are present; and perhaps such circumstances will be
found whenever an insurance corporation cannot soundly be liquidated by
the various state officials.
Since there is an excellent chance that the surge of Erie will displace the
federal equity rule and make state law govern, an inquiry into state law is in
order. Many states have enacted statutes permitting receiverships of insolvent
corporations on petition of an unsecured simple contract creditor. See Moore,
Cases and Materials on Debtors' and Creditors' Rights 147 (1955). However,
statutes of this character, applicable to corporations in general, must yield to
more specific enactments dealing with receiverships of insurance corporations,
and another common statutory development has been the adoption of statutes
which have the effect of prohibiting the appointment of a receiver of an insur-
ance corporation on petition of an unsecured simple contract creditor. E.g.,
Ill. Stat. Ann. c. 73, § 813 (Smith-Hurd 1940) ; Mich. Stat. Ann., Ins. Code
§ 24.17808 (1956); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 60.875 (47) (1946). The Minnesota
statute provides: "No order, judgment, or decree providing . . . for the
appointment of a temporary or permanent receiver [of an insurer], shall be
made or granted otherwise than upon the petition of the commissioner...
except in an action by a judgment creditor in proceedings supplementary to
execution after notice has been served upon the commissioner of such judg-
ment at least 30 days prior to the filing of a petition for that purpose." It is
thus apparent that if the Inland Empire gloss on Pusey & Jones Co. v.
Hanssen is followed, the law of many states on the availability of a receiver
will now be much more restrictive than the federal equity rule. If Inland
Empire is not followed, both the federal rule and the rule in many states will
be that a receiver cannot be appointed on petition of a simple contract creditor
over the objection of the corporation.
137. See, e.g., the Michigan statute cited supra note 136: "No applica-
tion for injunction against or proceedings for the dissolution of or the appoint-
ment of a receiver for any such insurance corporation included within the
provisions of this chapter, shall be entertained by any court in this state,
unless the same is made by the attorney general upon relation or application
of the commissioner of insurance of this state." If this statute is applicable in
a diversity action, not only are suits for receiverships by all creditors barred,
but even if a receivership on petition of a stockholder or policyholder might
otherwise be appropriate, see Glenn, Liquidation 254, 261 (1935), the statute
precludes the granting of such relief. Several decisions have held statutes of
this character applicable to federal court proceedings brought by policyhold-
ers. Cook v. Illinois Bankers' Life Ass'n, 46 F.2d 782 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 627 (1931); McGarry v. Lentz, 13 F.2d 51 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
273 U.S. 716 (1926) ; Wright v. The Praetorians, 63 F. Supp. 839 (N.D. Tex.
1943), aff'd, 152 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1945). Presumably, even the consent of
the corporation to the receivership would be unavailing in the face of such a
statute.
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pointed over the corporation's objection, the attempt may still foun-
der if the official in the state of incorporation charged with dealing
with the insolvency of this debtor insists upon handling the liquida-
tion or rehabilitation himself.""5
138. If that official commences state court proceedings for the liquidation
or rehabilitation of the debtor before the federal receivership proceeding is
begun, the federal court will be obliged to yield unless the state court is
willing to do so because, "[T]he first court whose jurisdiction and processes
is invoked by the filing of a suit [for receivership], is treated as in construc-
tive possession of the res and authorized to proceed in the cause. Having thus
acquired jurisdiction and possession, the property is thereby withdrawn from
the jurisdiction of all other courts, except to the extent to which that court
may determine." Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Apodaca, 239 F.2d 295,
297 (10th Cir. 1956), collects the leading authorities; additional authorities
are collected in Annot., 11 A.L.R.2d 460 (1950).
Even if the state official takes no action before federal jurisdiction attaches,
the continuation of the federal proceeding may depend upon his consent. See
Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S. 176 (1935), and Gordon v. Ominsky, 294
U.S. 186 (1935), in which the Supreme Court reversed lower court decisions
for failure to order federal equity receivers to turn over the assets of Penn-
sylvania building and loan associations to the Pennsylvania Secretary of
Banking. Accord, Gordon v. Washington, 295 U.S. 30 (1935) ; Penn General
Casualty Co. v. Pennsylvania ex rel. Schnader, 294 U.S. 189 (1935). In the
Williams case, after pointing out that federal jurisdiction was present, the
Court said: "The question remains whether, in the special circumstances of
the case, the district court rightly retained its jurisdiction. The relief prayed
in the bill of complaint is equitable in its nature, and the prayer was addressed
to the sound discretion which is the controlling guide of judicial action in ev-
ery phase of a suit in equity. The relief sought, an injunction and the appoint-
ment of receivers, was aimed at the prevention of irreparable injury, from the
waste of the assets of the insolvent corporation which would ensue from a
race of creditors . . . . By local statutes elaborate provision is made for
accomplishing the same end, through the action of a state officer, in substan-
tially the same manner and without substantially different results from those
to be attained in receivership proceedings in the federal courts. There is no
allegation or contention that the procedure thus provided is inadequate, or
that it will not be diligently and honestly followed. In such circumstances the
discretion of the district court ... should have been exercised to relinquish
the jurisdiction in favor of the statutory administration of the corporate assets
by the state officer." 294 U.S. at 182. It can be inferred from the latter part
of this passage that a federal court should exercise its jurisdiction where a
federal recievership will attain substantially better results than state adminis-
tration either because the state procedure is inadequate in some respect or
because the state procedure will not be diligently and honestly followed.
While the Supreme Court has not had occasion to elaborate this facet of its
opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has made the inference,
holding in Intermountain Building & Loan Ass'n v. Gallegos, 78 F.2d 972(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 639 (1935), that the federal district court
for Arizona did not abuse its discretion by appointing a receiver of the
Arizona assets of a Utah building and loan association over the objection of
the Utah official charged with the supervision of such corporations when it
appeared that the association had been insolvent for several years and the
Utah official had failed to take action. The court observed that the district
court could properly have found that the Utah official "had shown himself
not to be a proper person to husband the dwindling assets of the failing Asso-
ciation." Id. at 983. Cf. Gallegos v. Smith, 111 F.2d 805 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 311 U.S. 668 (1940) ; Brashear v. Intermountain Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
109 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 655 (1940), in which the same
court affirmed refusals to appoint receivers for the Oregon and California
assets of the same association because the statutory procedures of Oregon
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If a federal receivership can be obtained, section 754 of title 28
does seem to promise that at least the collection of assets of an insol-
vent insurance corporation will proceed more efficiently than it
would under numerous state administrations. That statute provides:
A receiver appointed in any civil action or proceeding involving
property, real, personal or mixed, situated in different districts
shall, upon giving bond as required by the court, be vested with
complete jurisdiction and control of all such property with the
right to take possession thereof.
He shall have capacity to sue in any district without ancillary
appointment, and may be sued with respect thereto .... 139
However, recent litigation involving the Inland Empire Insurance
Company illustrates that the gain in efficiency may not be very
great.14 0 Inland Empire is an Idaho corporation with assets and lia-
bilities in twenty-one states and its principal place of business in
Utah. A two-judge majority of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit believed that a receiver for Inland Empire should be ap-
pointed because, "[I]t would be wholly impractical under existing
state laws to liquidate the Company by local receiverships in the
various states in which the defendant Company is doing business,"
and "[F] ederal law has made adequate provision for the acquisition
and complete jurisdiction and control over the property of the Com-
pany wherever and in whatever district it may be located .... 14
Notwithstanding the federal law's provision for complete control
over the company's property, the court's concluding paragraph inti-
mates that perhaps the receiver ought not to exercise this control
in all cases:
It may well be that a number of the state insurance commis-
sioners having authority and duty to act will assert the right to
exclusively control the liquidation of the assests (sic) of the
Company in their respective states. In these circumstances, it
will of course be in the wise discretion of the trial court to avoid
undue conflict with the state court processes. 142
and California were adequate and it was not shown that those procedures
would not be diligently and honestly followed.
Intermountain Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Gallegos, supra, would further lim-
it the holding of the Supreme Court in Pennsylvania by Williams, .upra, by
pernitting a receiver to be appointed where the state in which the federal
receiver is sought has a public policy favoring local creditors over an out-of-
state liquidator of a foreign corporation and the official contesting the federal
receivership is from another state.
139. 62 Stat. 923 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 754 (1952).
140. See Inland Empire Insurance Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289 (10th
Cir. 1956) ; Continental Bank and Trust Co. v. Apodaca, 239 F.2d 295 (10th
Cir. 1956); Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Gold, 140 F. Supp. 252 (E.D.
N.C. 1956).
141. Inland Empire Insurance Co. v. Freed, mtpra note 140, at 293.
142. Ibid.
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If this means that the trial court should not insist that the federal
receiver prevail over the claims of local administrators to liquidate
property and satisfy claims within their states, then, of course, uni-
fied administration of the corporation is possible only if all of the
state administrators consent to the receivership. The improbability
of all twenty-one state officials being so agreeable is adequately dem-
onstrated by the fact that one took the trouble to intervene and
oppose the appointment of the receiver in the first instance.
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had a chance to de-
lineate more clearly the extent of its concern for avoidance of "un-
due conflict with state court processes" in Continental Bank and
Trust Co. v. Apodaca. 1 3 After the commencement of the Inland
Empire suit, but before the receiver was appointed, a New Mexico
state court appointed the superintendent of insurance of that state
conservator of $40,000 deposited by Inland Empire with the New
Mexico state treasurer for the protection of New Mexico creditors
and policy holders. After the federal receiver was appointed, he
brought suit in the federal district court for New Mexico to require
the New Mexico superintendent to turn over the $40,000. On appeal
from the dismissal of the receiver's suit, the court indicated first that
since the suit for a receiver was instituted in the Utah federal court
before the New Mexico state court proceeding was begun, the Utah
federal court had exclusive jurisdiction over the $40,000. However,
the court reasoned, because a federal court of equity may adopt any
means it deems appropriate to liquidate a debtor's estate, the Utah
federal court may, if it wishes, relinquish jurisdiction to the New
Mexico state court. Since New Mexico claimants have substantive
rights in the deposit made for their benefit, it may be that the best
means of proceeding would be to permit the New Mexico courts to
deal with that deposit. But this is a question for the Utah, not the
New Mexico, federal court: the dismissal must be reversed and the
lower court instructed to abide the decision of the Utah federal
court. While refusing to exercise the Utah court's discretion for it,
the Court of Appeals did say:
It seems not inappropriate.., to observe that each of the states
involved has provided procedural details for the rehabilitation,
conservation and liquidation of domestic insurance companies or
insurance companies licensed to do business in the state. And,
as we indicated in Inland Empire Insurance Co. v. Freed, . . .
it may be in the public interest to leave the procedural details
to the conservators of the respective states, subject always of
course to the paramount jurisdiction of the domiciliary federal
143. 239 F.2d 295 (10th Cir. 1956).
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court. ... [I]t will be within the province of the Utah court to
use its wise discretion to avoid unseemly conflicts within the
framework of the federal court receivership. 1 "4
Thus, it appears that while the Tenth Circuit is willing to ap-
point a receiver for the affairs of an insolvent insurance corporation,
it is not sure of the extent to which that receiver ought to displace
individual state administrations. The Utah district court is left to
fashion, as best it can, a truncated system of bankruptcy administra-
tion for insurance corporations.
That serious difficulties await the receiver of Inland Empire is
illustrated by Continental Bank & Trust Co. v. Gokl1 , 5 in which
Inland Empire's receiver sought to compel the Commissioner of
Insurance and the Treasurer of North Carolina to turn over a statu-
tory deposit made by the predecessor of Inland Empire. The court
held that the receiver was not entitled to possession of the deposit
under 28 U.S.C. § 754 because the deposit was not the property of
the insurance company:
It is the manifest intention of the North Carolina Legislature
that the title and rights to securities deposited in accord with
the above statutes are vested in the Commissioner, the Treas-
urer, and the State. These securities cannot be said to be the
"property" of the company which maintains them.... the only
property right of the company or its receiver is in the securities
or funds remaining after the trust is administered in accord with
the statutes that create it. 46
In this case the federal receiver was no better off than a receiver
from another state would have been.1
47
In sum, neither uniform legislation nor the federal equity receiv-
ership has been able to resolve the difficulties inherent in the insol-
vency administration of multi-state corporations. The failure of a
large majority of states to accept uniform legislation on this subject
seems to have vindicated the early prediction that such legislation
"is no more than a Utopian dream.' 148 The receivership suffers from
several ills: its limited availability is an obvious drawback; it re-
quires case by case development of a body of principles for unravel-
144. Id. at 300.
145. 140 F. Supp. 252 (E.D. N.C. 1956).
146. Id. at 257.
147. Cf. Note, Insurance Liquidations: A Proposed Amendment to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 66 Yale L.J. 1072, 1074 n. 11 (1957), citing Brief
for Receiver, p. 7, Inland Empire Ins. Co. v. Freed, 239 F.2d 289 (10th Cir.
1956) : "In the recent insolvency of the Inland Empire Insurance Co., the fed-
eral receiver has been able to marshal assets in sixteen of the twenty-one
states in which Inland did business. In the other states, where jurisdiction
over the insolvent's property was first assumed by the state courts, distribu-
tion will be made through independent receiverships."
148. Van Schaick, supra note 130, at 103.
1957]
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ling the complexities of administering insolvent insurance compa-
nies, a task that is surely more susceptible of accomplishment by
legislation; and respect for the-tender sensibilities of state courts
and administrators is, to some undefined extent, likely to impede
its use. That leaves the Bankruptcy Act.1 4 9
In view of the complexities of insurance company liquidation
and rehabilitation, it would be presumptuous for us to propose spe-
cific legislation. When the peculiarities of the insurance business
are considered, the most fruitful avenue for further study appears
to be a special bankruptcy chapter, rather than simple admittance
to straight bankruptcy and reorganization.150 To be dealt with are
such problems as how to treat the security deposits that insurance
companies are often required to make in the states in which they
do business. To what extent should state laws which prefer local
creditors and policyholders out of such deposits be respected?
Should creditors and policyholders who receive part payment from
such deposits be permitted to prove the remainder of their claims
on a par with creditors who have not been so preferred? Should
such preferred creditors and policyholders be postponed in distribu-
tion until other creditors and policyholders have received as great
149. As the title of Note, Insurance Liquidations: A Proposcd Anend-
inent to the McCarran-Ferguson Act 66 Yale L.J. 1072 (1957), indicates,
this piece recommends that the problems of liquidating interstate insurance
companies be dealt with under the commerce power via an amendment to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, rather than by bankruptcy legislation. While the
legislation needed could be sustained under either the commerce or bankrupt-
cy power, use of the commerce power seems tactically inadvisable. The oppo-
sition of the insurance industry to federal legislation dealing with the prob-
lems of insolvent insurance companies is probably based in part on the fear
that such legislation would be the opening wedge in the replacement of state
regulation by federal regulation. This fear, and hence the industry's opposi-
tion, is apt to become even more pronounced if such legislation takes the
form of an exercise of the federal government's virtually limitless commerce
power than if it appears as an exercise of the more confined bankruptcy power.
150. See 1 Corp. Reorg. 134 (1934), But see Report of the Cbunsel to
the Special Committee to the Chairman of the Special Committee to Investi-
gate Receivership and Bankruptcy Proceedings and Administration of Justice
in United States Courts, S. Doc. No. 268, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1936),
which advocated that Section 77B be amended to permit the excluded corpo-
rations to reorganize under that statute, subject to this qualification: "In
order, however, that benefit may be taken of beneficent State statutes, the
Federal court should be authorized to yield jurisdiction to the State courts,
where the following factors are all present: (1) all the assets and the places
of business of a corporation are located within the State of its organization;
(2) an adequate State statute for reorganization exists; (3) the corporation
is one which is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory commission or com-
missions or other regulatory authority or authorities created by the law of the
State of its organization and (4) the court finds the interests of the debtor
and its creditors will be best subserved by such relinquishment of jurisdic-
tion."
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a proportion of their claims as the preferred group ?'1 Or should
preferences from these special deposits be interdicted entirely and
the deposits devoted to the payment of all creditors and policyhold-
ers regardless of where located? Another problem is the role to be
accorded state administrators. A possible model is provided by sec-
tions 177 and 178 of the Bankruptcy Act, which require the appro-
priate regulatory commission's approval of a reorganization plan
for an intrastate public utility and an opportunity for such commis-
sions to suggest amendments or offer objections to a plan for a
public utility which is not confined to one state.1 52 Perhaps state
insurance commissioners should have an even greater role; it has
been suggested that if insurance corporations are brought under the
Bankruptcy Act, the right to invoke the statute should be confined
to state officials and they should be appointed bankruptcy trustees. 53
Some thought would also have to be given to priorities. For exam-
ple, should a policyholder's claim for unearned premiums, a widow's
claim for benefits on her husband's life insurance policy and a claim
of a commercial creditor of the company all receive the same treat-
ment ?264 Many other questions could be added to this list,' 55 but
enough have been set forth to warrant the conclusion that a special
bankruptcy chapter is probably the most appropriate vehicle for
solving the problems involved in administering an insolvent insur-
ance corporation.
B. Banking Corporations.
The need for bankruptcy legislation for banks is not nearly so
compelling as the need for insurance corporations. For one thing,
an insolvent bank is not likely to have its assets and liabilities quite
so widely scattered as an insolvent insurance company.'5 More
151. The Uniform Act adopts this position. Uniform Insurers Liquida-
tion Act § 7; cf. Bankruptcy Act § 67f(3), 54 Stat. 835 (1940), 11 U.S.C.
§ 107f(3) (1952).
152. See note 129 supra.
153. See Van Schaick, supra note 130, at 104; 1 Corp. Reorg. 134 (1934).
154. See Note, Insurance Liquidations: A Proposed Amendment to the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 66 Yale L.J. 1072, 1083 (1957), for a suggested
solution to this problem which the authors hope may help overcome "the tra-
ditional reluctance of Congress to dictate to the states in the field of insur-
ance."
155. For some further problems to be considered, see authorities cited
in note 130 supra.
156. The prevalence of statutes forbidding out-of-state banks to accept
deposits generally limits, but does not prevent wholesale scattering, for this
still leaves qualified out-of-state banks free to do such things as lend money,
buy and sell bills of exchange, issue letters of credit, and receive money for
transmission. See, e.g., Cal. Fin. Code Ann. § 1756 (West 1955). Out-of-state
banks are more severely limited in Minnesota. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.04(1947).
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important, insolvent banks are not all left to the same devices as
insolvent insurance companies.
Unified and probably efficient insolvency administration is avail-
able for national banks by virtue of the fact that Congress has vested
primary responsibility for their liquidation and rehabilitation in the
Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. 57 Because federal law governs, the barriers to success-
ful administration that face a state liquidator are avoided,5 s and so
there would seem to be no pressing reason to replace the present
system for national banks with bankruptcy legislation.
Federal legislation has affected the insolvency administration of
state banks too. Returning to the Uniform Commissioners' list of
problems,'59 we find, first, that expertise in the handling of an insol-
vent bank's affairs is made possible by the statutory authorization
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation to accept appoint-
ment as receiver of any closed insured bank if the appointment is
offered "by the authority having supervision of such bank and is
authorized or permitted by State law."'' 60 A majority of states, re-
sponding to this invitation, have authorized tender of receivership
appointments to the FDIC.'
Neither the statute governing the FDIC, the regulations prom-
ulgated under it, nor the cases construing it deal specifically with
the problems of collecting assets outside of the state of incorpora-
tion. It will be recalled that there are three major problems here:
(1) limitations on the right of a receiver to sue outside of the state
157. 13 Stat. 112 (1864), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 181-211 (1952) ; 48
Stat. 172 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c), (d) (1952). On June
30, 1956, there were 4,667 national banks out of a total of 14,426 banks in
this country; the national banks carried almost half of the total banking
assets and liabilities. See 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 47 (1957).
158. See Glenn, Liquidation 855 (1935) : "Although [a national] bank
while in operation is treated for some jurisdictional purposes as a citizen of
the state where it is located, that is because the federal statutes make the
concession. But there is no such concession when it comes to the winding
up of the institution. As the liquidation is wholly a matter of federal law
which operates uniformly in all the States, the receiver whom the Comptroller
puts in charge of a national bank is an officer of the United States, and his
powers are just as effective in one State as in another."
159. See text at note 130 supra.
160. 48 Stat. 174 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1952). The
Comptroller of the Currency is required to appoint the FDIC receiver of a
closed national bank. 48 Stat. 172 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c)(1952).
161. E.g., Cal. Fin. Code Ann. § 3220 (West 1955); Minn. Stat. Ann.§ 48.57 (1946) ; Wis. Stat. § 220.081 (1955).
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of his appointment ;162 (2) possible conflicts between the domiciliary
receiver and ancillary receivers over the title to and right to pos-
session of assets outside of the state of incorporation; and (3) the
danger that creditors outside of the state of incorporation will
obtain preferences by attaching property of the insolvent corpora-
tion in their states before ancillary proceedings are commenced.163
While appointment of the FDIC as receiver of a state bank may insure
greater expertise in the handling of the bank's affairs, it probably
does not confer any greater rights upon the FDIC than an ordinary
state receiver would have. 1 4 Consequently, states which deny out-
162. One of the exceptions to the limitations on the power of a receiver
to sue outside the state of his appointment is particularly relevant to bank re-
ceivers. Many states have had statutes imposing liability on bank stockholders
in addition to their ordinary liability for stock subscriptions. This added lia-
blity is for corporate debts and is imposed for the benefit of a banks creditors.
When the statute creating this added liability empowers a receiver to collect
on it, the receiver is treated as a "quasi-assignee" of the corporation's cred-
itors and may sue stockholders of the corporation in any state. If a state
denies him the right to sue, it denies full faith and credit to the statutes of
the state of incorporation. E.g., Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935) ;
Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912) ; see Goodrich, Conflict of Laws
588 (3d ed. 1949). This exception has become less important as a number of
states have elected to rely on the Federal Deposit Insurace Corporation for
the payment of an insolvent bank's debts and have largely elminated "super-
added" bank stockholder liability. See, e.g., Cal. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 3135,
3138 (West 1955); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 48.03, as amended, 1957 Minn. Laws
c. 601. For further consideration of the problems of collecting on stockhold-
ers' liability outside the state of incorporation, see Note, Foreign Enforce-
ment of Stockholder Liability, 36 Colum. L. Rev. 1108 (1936) and authorities
there cited; cf. Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941);
Christopher v. Brusselback, 302 U.S. 500 (1938).
163. See text at note 130 mtpra and authorities there cited. The problem
of preference by attachment is obviated for banks in a number of states by
statutes which deny attachment to creditors of a bank. See, e.g., Cal. Fin.
Code Ann. § 3105 (West 1955). The 1957 session of the Minnesota Legisla-
ture amended § 571.43 of the garnishment statute to provide: "No person or
corporation shall be adjudged a garnishee by reason of: ... Any money or
other thing due to the defendant where the defedant is a bank, savings bank,
trust company or a savings and loan association." Minn. Laws 1957, c. 184.
However, no comparable limitation was imposed on attachment, and while
the remedy of attachment is rather narrowly limited in Minnesota, it is
available against a foreign corporation. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 570.02 (1947).
The problem of preferences to creditors outside of the state of incorpora-
tion was presented in a different fashion by Hornick, More & Porterfield v.
Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 56 S.D5. 18, 227 N.W. 375 (1929), which held
that reduction of a bank's liabilities pursuant to a plan of reorganization does
not bind a non-resident creditor who did not participate in the reorganization
proceeding; such a creditor may, therefore, recover the full amount of his
claim. See 43 Harv. L. Rev. 1154 (1930); Comment, 32 Mich. L. Rev. 221(1933).
164. 48 Stat. 174, as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e) (1952) assures the
FDIC "all the rights, powers and privileges granted by State law to a receiver
of a State bank," but goes no further. The fourth paragraph of § 1819 tends
to support the conclusion that the FDIC acquires only the rights which any
state receiver would have. That paragraph excepts from the provision that
suits to which the FDIC is a party "shall not be deemed to arise under the
laws of the United States" suits "to which the Corporation is a party in its
19571
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of-state chancery receivers6 " the power to sue probably can deny
that power to the FDIC in its capacity as receiver if bank receivers
are merely chancery receivers under the law of the state in which the
FDIC was appointed. Similarly, if a state in which an insolvent bank
has assets wishes to confer the title to and right to possession of those
assts on an ancillary receiver other than the FDIC, the FDIC's rights
to those assets as domiciliary receiver would be inferior to the rights
of the ancillary receiver. Finally, it would seem that a state's power
to permit an attaching creditor to prevail over an out-of-state
receiver previously appointed is not diminished by the fact that
the out-of-state receiver happens to be the FDIC.16 The FDIC
could, of course, seek appointment as ancillary receiver in each of
the states in which the bank had assets, but this can be cumbersome
and expensive and, furthermore, not every state has authorized
appointment of the FDIC as receiver.
Despite the failure of the authorities to deal specifically with the
problems of collecting assets outside of the state of incorporation,
the FDIC does have powers which may help it achieve the benefits
of unified insolvency administration. When an insured bank be-
comes insolvent and is unable to pay its depositors in full, the
FDIC can fulfill its insurance obligation by having another insured
bank assume the deposit liabilities of the insolvent bank. Obviously,
no bank will agree to assume those liabilities unless it receives a
commensurate transfer of assets, and since the insolvent bank pre-
sumably lacks the requisite assets, the FDIC must agree to supply
the deficiency. It may do this by lending to the insolvent bank enough
funds to make up the deficit, with the insolvent bank's more dubious
assets as collateral for the loan. The insolvent bank then transfers
its acceptable assets, including the proceeds of the FDIC loan, to
capacity as receiver of a State bank and which involves only the rights or
obligations of depositors, creditors, stockholders, and such State bank under
State law ......
165. A chancery receiver is a receiver whose powers derive primarily
from court appointment rather than from a statute in the state of incorpora-
tion designating him as the official to whom title to the assets of a bank in
liquidation shall pass. Authorities on the nature of bank receiverships in vari-
ous states are collected in Legis. Note, Legal Devices for the Rehabilitation
of Banks, 32 Colum. L. Rev. 1395 nn. 3 & 4 (1932; see 3 Michie, Banks and
Banking 34-37 (1931).
166. That states may, and often do, permit an attaching creditor to
prevail over an out-of-state chancery receiver previously appointed is clear.
See Goodrich, op. cit. supra note 162, at 590. A state's power to treat an out-
of-state statutory successor this way is somewhat limited by the Clark v.
Williard litigation, 292 U.S. 112 (1934), 294 U.S. 211 (1935), but some states
continue to permit a levying creditor to prevail over an out-of-state statutory
successor previously appointed. See Note, Insurance Liquidations: A Pro-
posed Amendment to the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 66 Yale L.J. 1072, 1073
(1957), and authorities there cited.
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the assuming bank.167 The transaction leaves the insolvent bank
with only its equity of redemption in the doubtful assets transferred
to the FDIC, which is worthless, of course, because the loan ex-
tended by the FDIC will have far exceeded the value of the doubtful
assets transferred to it. Use of this arrangement could avoid to
a considerable extent the problems of collecting the bank's assets
outside of the state of incorporation. As transferee of those assets,
the assuming bank or the FDIC, as the case may be, obviously has
the right to sue anywhere to protect the rights acquired by the trans-
fer. No ancillary receivership is worth the trouble because the in-
solvent bank's only remaining asset is presumably worthless. Simi-
larly, nothing remains for any creditor of the bank to attach.
If the procedure outlined above is successfully employed, another
problem on the Uniform Commissioners' list ceases to be bothersome.
If there are not ancillary administrations, there will be no need to
determine whether the law of the corporation's domicile or the
law of the place of ancillary administration governs priorities in
the distribution of an insolvent bank's assets.
Unfortunately, the assumption of deposit liabilities arrangement
has some rather serious drawbacks when viewed as a device for
avoiding the problems of collecting out-of-state assets. If creditors
who are unprotected by deposit insurance learn of the bank's pre-
167. A full description of this sort of arrangement can be found in
Thomas P. Nichols & Son Co. v. National City Bank of Lynn, 313 Mass. 421,
48 N.E.2d 49, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 742 (1943). Authorization for this prac-
tice is contained in § 1823(e) of Title 12: "Whenever in the judgment of the
Board of Directors such action will reduce the risk or avert a threatened loss
to the Corporation and will facilitate a merger or consolidation of an insured
bank with another insured bank, or will facilitate the sale of the assets of an
open or closed insured bank to and assumption of its liabilities by another
insured bank, the Corporation may, upon such terms and conditions as it
may determine, make loans secured in whole or in part by assets of an open
or closed insured bank, which loans may be in subordination to the rights of
depositors and other creditors, or the Corporation may purchase any such
assets or may guarantee any other insured bank against loss by reason of its
assuming the liabilities and purchasing the assets of an open or closed insured
bank" As this section indicates, variations on the arrangement described in
the text are possible. The FDIC, instead of lending money on the security of
the dubious assets, may purchase them outright. See Brown v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 152 F.2d 246 (9th Cir. 1945); Lamberton v. FDIC, 141 F.2d
95 (3d Cir. 1944); FDIC v. Rectenwall, 97 F. Supp. 273 (N.D. Ind. 1951);
FDIC v. Cloonan, 165 Kan. 68, 193 P.2d 656 (1948). Or, instead of dealing
with an existing insured bank, the FDIC may organize a new bank to take
over the deposit liabilities of the insolvent corporation. 48 Stat. 175 (1933),
as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(h)-(l) (1952); see FDIC v. Wainer, 4 Ill.
App.2d 233, 124 N.E.2d 29 (1955). Section 1823(c) even authorizes the
FDIC to keep the insolvent bank in operation by loans or purchase of its
assets "when in the opinion of the Board of Directors [of the FDIC] the
continued operation of such bank is essential to provide adequate banking
service in the community."
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carious condition before the transfer is completed, they can attempt
a levy on the bank's assets or take steps to obtain a receivership of
the bank's assets in their state.168 If either event occurs before the
transfer is completed, the interest of the levying creditor or receiver
in those assets will be superior to that of the insolvent bank's trans-
feree, whether that is the assuming bank or the FDIC. In addition,
the rights of creditors other than depositors are uncertain when the
assumption arrangement is employed. The assumption agreements
reported in the cases characteristically make no provision for credi-
tors other than depositors.169 The indications are that non-deposit
claims are settled either by the insolvent bank with the approval
of the FDIC before the transfer to the assuming bank is concluded,
or by the FDIC after the transfer. 70 However, if the claim of a
creditor other than a depositor is not settled, while he may have a
remedy against the assuming bank, he has no practical remedy
against the judgment-proof defunct bank and no rights at all against
the FDIC.'- There is some danger, then, of oppression of creditors
168. In many states receivership proceedigs can only be instituted by the
state official in charge of banking. See 9 Zollman, Banks and Banking § 6204(1936) and authorities there cited.
169. See cases cited note 167 supra.
170. See FDIC Ann. Rep. 8 (1953); Lamberton v. FDIC, 141 F.2d 95(3d Cir. 1944); Thomas P. Nichols & Son Co. v. National City Bank of
Lynn, 313 Mass. 421, 48 N.E.2d 49, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 742 (1943).
If the bank offers partial payment to creditors before the deal is con-
cluded, there is the obvious danger that those creditors will attempt to gain
a greater share of their claims by levying on the assets of the bank. Conse-
quently, to the extent that this means of settling with creditors other than
depositors is used, one purpose of the assumption arrangement may be de-
feated.
171. In Lamberton v. FDIC, supra note 170, the bank's board of direc-
tors, over the objection of the FDIC's representative, voted to pay the bank's
employees their full month's wages even though the bank was to close on the
twentieth of the month. After the payment was made, the FDIC's represen-
tative caused the amount of the excess payment to be charged against the
deposit account of plaintiff, the bank's president. Since the assuming bank was
only to be responsible for the closed bank's deposit liabilities, plaintiff was
credited by the assuming bank with only the amount of his reduced account.
Holding that the FDIC was not liable to the plaintiff for the amount by
which his deposit was diminished, the court stated that, "The fact that a par-
ticular claim against a bank was not taken into consideration in fixing the
terms upon which the F.D.I.C. made a loan to a bank, gives the creditor of
the bank no claim against the F.D.I.C." Id. at 97. The court declined to pass
on the question whether the payment to the bank's employees was illegal and
properly chargeable to the plaintiff. For the purposes of the decision, then, it
must be assumed that the plaintiff had a valid claim against the closed bank
which was unprovided for by the assumption agreement, and the court's lan-
guage indicates that it would apply the same rule to any non-deposit creditor
whose claim was not included in the assumption agreement, regardless of how
the claim arose. See Thomas P. Nichols & Son Co. v. National City Bank of
Lynn, 313 Mass. 421, 48 N.E.2d 49, 53, cert. denied, 320 U.S. 742 (1943).
The assumption agreement was not, of course, invented by the draftsmen
of the FDIC legislation: before that legislation was enacted, such agreements
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other than depositors when the assumption agreement is employed.
Finally, if the insolvent bank has deposited securities in another
state pursuant to a statute which makes a security deposit for the
benefit of local creditors a condition to doing business in that state172
the bank's lack of power to transfer those securities without the
consent of their official custodian would prevent title from passing
to either the FDIC or the assuming bank, and the securities would
be applied to the claims of creditors in the depository state.
Whatever the potential utility of the assumption of liabilities
arrangement, it cannot be much help unless the FDIC is willing to
use it. The regulations provide that, "The Corporation's practice
has been to make such payment[s] [of insured deposits] by issuing
its check for the amount of the insured deposit."' 3 In fact, how-
ever, the Corporation has utilized the assumption arrangement in
a substantial proportion of the cases in which insured banks have
failed: "During the 23 years of Federal deposit insurance ending
December 31, 1956, the Corporation made disbursements to protect
depositors of 431 banks.... Deposits were paid up to the insurance
maximum in 250 cases; deposit assumptions were arranged in the
remaining 181 cases.' 7 4 Whether the FDIC will arrange a deposit
assumption depends largely on how serious the difficulties of the
distressed bank are: the greater the deterioration of the distressed
bank's position the greater the likelihood that the FDIC will elect
to pay depositors off directly and let the bank go into receivership.
75
The FDIC's practice in this respect is attributable to the fact that
when an assumption arrangement is employed, the $10,000 per
were occasionally worked out by banks without any governmental assistance.
See Annot., 84 A.L.R. 1425 (1933) for a collection of some instances. If such
an agreement failed to provide for creditors other than depositors, it might
be held a fraudulent transfer assailable by a general creditor's bill demanding
ratable distribution to all creditors of the assets transferred. See 1 Glenn,
Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences 481-483 (1940). There would seem
to be no harm in applying this principle to assumption agreements arranged
by the FDIC as long as the funds provided by the FDIC are not considered
a part of the assets to be shared by all creditors. Non-deposit creditors would
then be assured of their fair share of the distressed bank's assets. New York
has adopted a statute which specifically protects the rights of all creditors to
pro rata payment even though the FDIC arranges a deposit assumption. N.Y.
Banking Law § 605-a.
172. See Cal. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 1751(g), 1752 (West 1955).
173. 12 C.F.R. § 305.1 (Supp. 1956).
174. FDIC Ann. Rep. 9 (1956). With the exception of 1955, the prac-
tice in recent years actually seems to have favored the asumption arrange-
ment. A deposit assumption was arranged for one of the two insured banks
which failed in 1956 and for one of the five insured banks which failed in 1955.
Deposit assumptions were arranged for every one of the twenty-seven insured
banks which failed during the decade 1945-1954. See ibid.; FDIC Ann. Rep.
162 (1955).
175. See FDIC Ann. Rep. 11 (1952).
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account insurance limit is not applied, every deposit being assumed
in full regardless of size.1.7 Since the assumption arrangement thus
subjects the FDIC to much greater potential loss than would direct
payment of depositors within the insurance limits, 17 7 its reluctance
to employ this procedure for a really woebegone bank is readily
understandable.
In sum, the FDIC has at its disposal a procedure that can help
achieve efficient and fair insolvency administration of state banks,
but this procedure does have serious drawbacks and the FDIC is not
likely to use it if doing so will substantially increase its own losses.
The principal impact of the FDIC on the problems of state bank
insolvency has nothing to do with the machinery for liquidation at
its disposal. The FDIC's impact derives, rather, from its power to
help prevent insolvency and from the fact that it assures the over-
whelming majority of a bank's creditors, depositors of less than
$10,000, of full payment.7 8 Insured banks must submit to con-
siderable supervision by the FDIC in order to acquire and retain
176. See FDIC Ann. Rep. 12 (1956); FDIC Ann. Rep. 5 (1954).
177. While, at the end of 1956, approximately 98 per cent of all accounts
in insured banks had balances of less than $10,000 and hence were fully in-
sured ,the balances in the remaining 2 per cent of accounts were sufficiently
large to bring the estimated percentage of insured funds down to 55 per cent of
the funds on deposit with insured banks. Thus, of $218 billion on deposit in
insured banks, only about $120 billion were insured. See FDIC Ann. Rep. 3
(1956). Because the largest banks contain the largest deposits and so have the
largest amount of uninsured deposit liability, see FDIC Ann. Rep. 49 (1955),
the larger the bank the greater the apparent cost to the FDIC in excess of its
insurance obligation when a deposit assumption is arranged. We might ex-
pect, then, that the larger the bank the less attractive an assumption arrange-
ment would be to the FDIC. In fact, the FDIC's statistics reveal that the
larger the bank the greater the likelihood that an assumption of deposits will
be arranged. Thus, deposit assumptions were arranged for forty-seven of the
216 insured banks which failed with deposits of less than $250,000, for fifty-
nine of the 122 insured banks which failed with deposits between $250,000 and
$1 million, for fifty-seven of the seventy-two insured banks which failed with
deposits between $1 million and $5 million, and for seventeen of the nineteen
insured banks which failed with deposits in excess of $5 million. See FDIC
Ann. Rep. 162 (1955). This apparent Contradiction is accounted for in part
by the fact that larger banks generally hold substantial interbank deposits
which are normally well over $10,000. Id. at 53. If the FDIC refuses to ar-
range a deposit assumption and all but $10,000 of each interbank deposit is
lost to the depositing banks, the depositing banks may well find themselves in
difficulties which cause additional failures. Thus, even though arranging a de-
posit assumption may cause the FDIC a greater immediate loss with respect
to the failed bank, the arrangement may actually save the FDIC from consid-
erable losses over the long run.
178. "Losses to depositors of insured banks since establishment of the
Corporation have amounted to 0.5 per cent of their deposits; and only 0.3 per
cent of the depositors have experienced any loss. All depositors of the 181
banks whose deposits were assumed by another insured bank were fully pro-
tected. In the 250 banks where payoffs occurred, 97.4 per cent of deposits have
been paid or made available; and full recovery has been received or made
available to 99.1 per cent of the depositors." FDIC Ann. Rep. 12 (1956) ; see
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their insured status. 70 The FDIC's supervision, in conjunction with
that of other government agencies,180 diminishes the likelihood that
an insured bank will engage in unsound banking practices leading
to insolvency or continue in such practices for very long."8 If in-
solvency does occur, the FDIC's assurance of payment to depositors
means that there will be few creditors interested in seeking prefer-
ences by levy on the bank's out-of-state assets. Similarly, since
a domiciliary liquidator is resisted by other states largely because
of fear that local creditors would be prejudiced by according him full
rights,182 the FDIC's assurance of payment to depositors may re-
note 177 mupra. 12 C.F.R. § 326.1 (Supp. 1956) defines "deposit" rather
broadly, including:
(a) Outstanding drafts, cashiers' checks and other officers' checks.
Outstanding drafts, cashiers' checks, and other officers' checks issued un-
der any of the following circumstances:
(1) For money or its equivalent received by the issuing bank; or
(2) For a charge against a deposit account in the issuing bank;
or (3) In settlement of checks, drafts, or other instruments for-
warded to the issuing bank for collection.
(b) Certified checks. Checks drawn against a deposit account and
certified by the drawee bank.
(c) Letters of credit and traveler's checks. Outstanding letters of
credit or traveler's checks on which the bank is primarily liable issued
under either of the following circumstances:(1) For money or its equivalent received by the issuing bank; or
(2) For a charge against a deposit account in the issuing bank.
(d) Special purpose funds. Money received or held by the bank, or
the credit given therefor to an account including a special or memoran-
dum account, which money or credit is held for a special or specific pur-
pose, regardless of whether the relationship thereby created is that of
debtor-creditor, fiduciary, or any other relationship.
179. See 48 Stat. 168 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1815-1820, 1828,
1829 (1952) ; 12 C.F.R. parts 303, 304, 329, 332, 333 (Supp. 1956) ; FDIC
Ann. Rep. 308 (1956).
180. The FDIC's supervision supplements that exercised by the Comp-
troller General and Federal Reserve System over national banks, that ex-
ercised by state authorities and the Federal Reserve System over members of
the Federal Reserve System and that exercised by state authorities over
state banks not members of the Federal Reserve System.
181. See, e.g., FDIC Ann. Rep. 4 (1955): "When examination of a bank
reveals unsafe or unsound banking practices or a violation of law or regula-
tions, the examiner confers with the officials of the bank and its board of
directors. The necessary corrections are usually forthcoming. However,
where such practices or violations persist, the Corporation has a legal duty
imposed upon it by Section 8 (a) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act to in-
stitute proceedings for the involuntary termination of the insured status
of such bank. Proceedings are initiated only after every effort has been
made through cooperation with the bank to obtain the observance of sound
and lawful procedures; for the primary purpose of such proceedings is to
secure discontinuance of the unsound and unlawful practices."
182. If a domiciliary liquidator is permitted to prevail over local levying
creditors, they may receive a smaller share of the distribution than their
levies would net them; if he is permitted complete freedom to sue and collect
assets, there may be insufficient assets left in the state to satisfy local creditors,
and they may then be forced to the inconvenience and expense of presenting
their claims in the proceedings at the corporation's domicile, where the rules
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duce hostility to the domiciliary liquidator of a bank. Again, since
contests over what state's law ought to govern the priority of claims
usually arise only when creditors fear that nobody but priority
claimants will be fully satisfied, the FDIC's assurance of payment to
depositors should render such contests uncommon.
Therefore, if we were to decide that no bankruptcy chapter is
needed for state banks, it would be largely because we believe, not
that existing insolvency machinery is adequate, but that the prob-
lems which are likely to cause this machinery to break down will be
prevented from arising by the operations of the FDIC, coupled
with the activities of other supervisory authorities. In assessing the
extent to which we ought to repose confidence in this belief, we
should consider several gaps in the protection afforded by the FDIC.
First, almost five per cent of the nation's total banking assets and
liabilities are still carried by uninsured banks over which the FDIC
has no control and to whose depositors it owes no obligation.1 13
Second, a small percentage of every bank's liabilities is made up of
non-deposit claims which do not fall within the FDIC insurance
coverage.184 Finally, notwithstanding the high percentage of ac-
counts which are fully protected by insurance, approximately forty-
five per cent of the funds on deposit with insured banks are un-
insured because carried in accounts which exceed the $10,000 insur-
ance maximum.18 5 The FDIC does, of course, have some effect on
these gaps: its existence promotes greater confidence in banks and
thereby reduces the likelihood and severity of failure-causing runs;
its payment of insured claims may prevent a worsening of the over-all
governing provability and priority of claims may be less favorable to them.
For a less earthy explanatign of the inhospitable treatment accorded out-of-
state receivers, see Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 585-586 (3d ed. 1949) and
authorities there cited.
183. See 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 47 (1957). These assets and liabilities are
carried by over 5 per cent of the nation's banks. See FDIC Ann. Rep. 3
(1956). The absence of FDIC supervision and coverage does not, of course,
mean that these banks are moving inexorably to their doom. In fact, the
record of failures among uninsured banks in recent years is quite favorable:
from the beginning of 1951 to the end of 1955 only seven uninsured banks
failed. See FDIC Ann. Rep. 161 (1955) ; id. at 165 (1954) ; id. at 131 (1953);
id. at 139 (1952) ; id. at 187 (1951).
184. The total non-deposit liabilities of all insured commercial banks in
the United States constituted 1.49 per cent of these banks' total liabilities (in-
cluding capital accounts) dt the end of 1955. See FDIC Ann. Rep. 145 (1955).
The percentage increases with the size of the bank, ranging from 0.25 per cent
for banks with deposits of less than $1 million to 2.46 per cent for banks with
.deposits of $500 million or more. Ibid. The percentages for insured mutual
savings banks are somewhat lower. Id. at 159. While the percentages are
small, the actual sums involved are rather substantial. Thus, at the end of
1955, non-deposit liabilities for all banks in the United States totalled
$3,503,132,000; $3,362,435,000 of this was owed by insured banks. Id. at 124.
185. See note 177 supra.
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economy and thereby reduce the likelihood that additional banks
owing uninsured debts will fail; and when an assumption of de-
posits is arranged for a failing insured bank, claims will probably
be paid in full even though not insured in full.1 86 Nevertheless, the
gaps are not wholly closed, and since we can only guess about
whether the operations of the FDIC and other governmental agen-
cies will prevent widespread failures in an economic crisis or avoid
the evils of fragmented insolvency administration if such failures
do occur, it seems the better part of valor to take further precautions
and provide more adequate insolvency machinery for state banks.
As with insurance corporations, a special bankruptcy chapter
adapted to the special problems of insolvent banks seems the wisest
course. Again, as with insurance corporations, among the impor-
tant problems to be resolved will be the role to be assigned to
existing administrative agencies and the extent to which state law
dealing with such matters as priorities and special deposits should
be respected.18 7 In order to preserve the best of existing pro-
cedures, it probably would be wise to provide that only the
FDIC could invoke the Bankruptcy Act for insured banks, and that
if the statute were invoked the FDIC would be appointed trustee.
For uninsured banks, the possibility of permitting the statute to be
invoked only by the state official charged with supervision of the
bank involved should be seriously considered.
C. Building and Loan Associations.
Our discussion respecting banks is also largely applicable to
building and loan associations. The insolvency administration of
federal savings and loan associations, like that of national banks,
is controlled by federal officials acting under federal law.18 8 As with
national banks, then, the barriers to successful administration that
face a state liquidator are avoided, and so there would seem to be
no compelling reason to replace the present system with bankruptcy
legislation. Similarly, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Cor-
186. See text at note 176 supra.
187. See text at notes 150-155 supra.
188. See 48 Stat. 133 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)
(1957), vesting exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
to appoint "a Supervisory Representative in Charge, a conservator, or a
receiver" of a federal association, requiring that the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation be appointed receiver when a receivership is deemed
necessary, and empowering the Federal Home Loan Bank Board "to make
rules and regulations for the reorganization, merger, and liquidation of
Federal associations and for such associations in conservatorship and re-
ceivership and for the conduct of conservatorships and receiverships"; 48 Stat.
1260 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1729(b) (1952), dealing with the
powers of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation as receiver.
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poration is a close analog of the FDIC, performing for building and
loan associations approximately the same functions which the FDIC
performs for banks.'8  The only important question remaining is
whether state building and loan associations should be left outside
the scope of bankruptcy because they typically operate within a
narrow geographical area, 90 reducing the probability that problems
of fragmented insolvency administration will arise. While diffusion
of assets and liabilities is apt to be a minor problem for the liquidator
189. See 48 Stat. 1255 (1934), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1724-1730(1952), as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1724-1730 (1956), empowering the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, among other things, to
insure each account in a savings and loan association up to $10,000, to accept
appointment as the receiver of any closed insured association, to arrange an
assumption of deposits, and to exercise considerable supervisory powers over
insured institutions. See also 24 C.F.R. §§ 161.1-. (Supp. 1956). Like the
supervision exercised by the FDIC, the supervision exercised by the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation supplements that of other govern-
mental agencies: federal associations are subject to supervision by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board; state associations, in addition to being subject to
supervision by state authorities, become subject to supervision by the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board if they become members of the Federal Home Loan
Bank System. For a full description of the activities of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, the Federal Home Loan Bank System and the Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, see Federal Home Loan Bank
Board Ann. Rep. (1955). For a discussion of state statutory provisions aimed
at preventing and ameliorating the effects of the insolvency of building and
loan associations, see Legis. Note, Statutory Control over the Dissolution
of Building and Loan Associations, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 265 (1935) ; cf. Note,
Building and Loan Liquidation, California Style, 3 Stan. L. Rev. 60 (1950).
190. See text at note 108 supra; Sundheim, Building and Loan Associa-
tions 35 (3d ed. 1933) : "The statutes under which associations are incorpo-
rated rarely prohibit the doing of business outside of the state, but most of
the states have statutes, regulating the doing of business by foreign associa-
tions, with which it is almost impossible to comply, and as a result, associa-
tions are practically confined to the state of their incorporation in making real
estate loans. What has been said applies only to loans on the security of
real estate. It does not apply to the selling of shares of stock to persons re-
siding in a foreign state nor to the making of loans to them on the security
of their stock." The state statutes on out-of-state associations are more varied
than this passage from Sundheim would indicate. Thus, some states forbid
entirely the transaction of savings and loan business by out-of-state associa-
tions. See, e.g., N.Y. Banking Law § 408. Others condition the doing of any
sort of savings and loan business, including the selling of shares, by an out-of-
state association on compliance with fairly rigorous requirements. See, e.g.,
Cal. Fin. Code Ann. §§ 5800-5814 (West 1955). Minnesota permits the mak-
ing of loans on real estate within certain areas, but forbids any other activity
by an out-of-state association. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 303.04 (Supp. 1956).
Limitations are also imposed by federal law. See 48 Stat. 1258 (1934), as
amended, 12 U.S.C. § 1726(b) (1952) : "Each applicant for such insurance
shall also file with its application an agreement that during the period that
the insurance is in force it will not make any loans beyond fifty miles from its
principal office except with the approval of, and pursuant to regulations of
the Corporation, but any applicant which, prior to June 27, 1934, has been
permitted to make loans beyond such fifty-mile limit may continue to make
loans within the territory in which the applicant is operating on such date.
." The circumstances under which the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation will grant approval to loans outside the fifty-mile limit are set
forth in 24 C.F.R. §§ 163.9, 163.10 (Supp. 1956).
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of an insolvent building and loan association, it can occasionally
be troublesome.' 9' Consequently, since we incur no disadvantage by
bringing state building and loan associations under the Bankruptcy
Act and some advantage will occasionally result, this exclusion too
should be ended.
IV. CORPORATIONS THAT ARE NOT MONEYED, BUSINESS OR
COMMERCIAL
The state classification test is little used in applying the exclu-
sion from involuntary bankruptcy of corporations that are not
moneyed, business or commercial.' 9 - This is undoubtedly due in
part to the fact that states do not usually have such a classification,
but even when help can be found in state law, 9 3 independent char-
acterization is preferred. Perhaps the state classification test is
eschewed in this area because the premise used to justify it for
banks, insurance companies and building and loan associations-
191. See, e.g., Brashear v. Intermountain Building & Loan Ass'n, 109
F.2d 857 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 655 (1940). Insofar as the restric-
tive state legislation set forth in note 190 supra, falls short of the total bar
imposed by New York, interstate activity by a building and loan association
is still possible. Nor is the fifty-mile limit imposed by the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance statute a complete bar to interstate activity. Fifty miles can,
of course, include part of a state other than that in which the association's
principal office is located; dispensations from the fifty-mile limit can be
obtained under the statute and regulations; and the restriction obviously is
inapplicable to uninsured associations, which hold about ten per cent of the
savings and mortgages of all operating associations in the country. See
Federal Home Loan Bank Board Ann. Rep. 34 (1955).
192. No case on this subject relies solely on state classification and few
rely at all. In the latter group fall Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 136 F.2d 133
(4th Cir. 1943) ; It re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp.
979 (E.D. Mich. 1937), appeal dismissed, 96 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1938) ; In re
Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925). The test is expressly re-
jected in It re Wisconsin Co-op Milk Pool, 119 F.2d 999, 1002 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 314 U.S. 655 (1941) : "The state can not determine who shall
be admitted to bankruptcy; that is the function of Congress. We can only
inquire whether a corporation, whose powers are defined by the state statute,
comes within the Congressional definition of those who may be declared
bankrupts. Thus far and thus far only may we have reference to the Wis-
consin statutes. . . . Federal legislation, in pursuance of the Constitution,
determines whether an interest or right created by local law is within the
federal law. The latter must prevail no matter what name is given the interest
or right by the local law." Even one of the leading cases for the state classifi-
cation test in the insurance context concedes that it would define "moneyed,
business or commercial" by referring to the principal business conducted by
the debtor. See Sims v. Fidelity Assur. Ass'n, 129 F.2d 442, 448 (4th Cir.
1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 608 (1943) (dictum).
193. To the extent that bankruptcy courts have assumed that a corpo-
ration is not moneyed, business or commercial if it is a nonprofit enterprise,
see text infra at note 210 and authorities there cited, a state classification may
be found, since several kinds of corporations are typically styled nonprofit
by state statute. Seee.g, the state statutes discussed in Hoile v. Unity Life Ins.
Co., 136 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1943) ; Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Co-op Milk
Ass'n, 61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932).
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Congress desired to leave the liquidation of these corporations to the
states-is clearly inapplicable. If Congress had wished to leave the
liquidation of corporations that are not moneyed, business or com-
mercial to their home states, certainly the exclusion would have
been extended to voluntary as well as involuntary bankruptcy. It
seems likely that when Congress adopted this involuntary bank-
ruptcy exclusion in 1910, it did so because it thought that corpora-
tions which were unconcerned with money, business or commerce
should not have their laudable activities disrupted by liquidation at
the instance of pestiferous creditors. Perhaps, too, the members
of Congress felt that a remedy once thought of as the special
province of blackguards, and occasionally still so regarded, ought
not to be inflicted on such highminded enterprises. In short, Con-
gress' purpose was not to leave the liquidation of corporations that
are not moneyed, business or commercial to the states, but to give
those corporations a dispensation from an unpleasant law designed
for the self-seeking world of commerce and business.194
In view of the primacy of independent characterization in this
area, we might expect to find some serious grappling with the prob-
lem of whether 'the powers or activities of a corporation should
determine its characterization. In fact, this problem has received
very little consideration. Almost all of the cases have involved
corporations which did approximately what they were empowered
to do ; 95 in the one case in which a corporation apparently did
exceed its powers, the court, without explanation, relied on activities,
to find that the debtor was moneyed, business or commercial.1 10
While no attempt was made to justify this conclusion, we submit
that the case was correctly decided. If there is something especially
meritorious about corporations that are not moneyed, business or
commercial which justifies sparing them from involuntary bank-
ruptcy, it must stem from their activities, for unused powers set
forth in a corporate charter have no effect, beneficial or otherwise,
on anybody.197
The basic problem remains: how have the courts defined
"moneyed, business or commercial"? It will be recalled that the
phrase first appears in the Act of 1867 in response to the fear that
194. See text at notes 39-41 supra.
195. See, e.g., Missco Homestead Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 185 F.2d
280 (8th Cir. 1950) ; In re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F.
Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1937), appeal dismissed, 96 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1938);
In re Deauville, Inc., 52 F.2d 963 (D. Nev. 1931).
196. In re Roumanian Workers Educational Ass'n, 108 F.2d 782 (6th
Cir. 1940).
197. Cf. text at notes 109-116 suPra.
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religious, educational and eleemosynary corporations might be in-
voluntarily adjudicated bankrupt if all corporations were made
subject to bankruptcy.""' This bit of legislative history found favor
with the courts, the following passage being rather typical of the
language used in cases decided under the Act of 1867:
[S]uch private corporations as are ecclesiastical, or eleemo-
synary, or established for the advancement of learning, are
clearly not made subject to the provisions of the act .... The
words . . . "moneyed, business or commercial corporations,"
would seem to have been intended to embrace all those classes
of corporations that deal in or with money or property in the
transactions of money, business or commerce for pecuniary gain,
and not for religious, charitable or educational purposes.',,
The cases decided since the 1910 resurrection of the "moneyed,
business or commercial" clause have generally been faithful to Con-
gress' indication that it was enacting that language as judicially
construed under the Act of 1867.200 Thus, there is no doubt that
any corporation which seeks to earn profits to be distributed to its
stockholders is amenable to involuntary bankruptcy. 20 ' The pre-
vailing view treats agricultural marketing cooperatives the same
way; that profits are distributed to producers, not on the basis of
shares owned, but on the basis of the amount of business transacted
with the organization does not negate the fact that the corporation
is seeking financial gain for its members. 20 2 It is equally clear that
religious, charitable and educational corporations which do not
engage in profit-making activity are not moneyed, business or com-
mercial. 203
The law is not so clear when a religious, charitable or educa-
tional corporation carries on profit-making activity, even though it
198. See text at notes 5-8 supra.
199. Adams v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co., 1 Fed. Cas. No. 47, at 91 (D.
Mass. 1870). The leading authorities are collected in Bump, Bankruptcy 792
(10th ed. 1877) ; see Annot., 22 A.L.R. 2d 1021, 1025 (1952).
200. See text at note 27 supra.
201. E.g., In re Deauville, Inc., 52 F.2d 963 (D. Nev. 1931) ; In re R. L.
Radke Co., 193 Fed. 735 (N.D. Cal. 1911) ; Hoile v. Unity Life Ins. Co., 136
F.2d 133, 135 (4th Cir. 1943) (dictum); ln re Wisconsin Co-op. Milk Pool,
119 F.2d 999, 1001 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 655 (1941) (dictum).
202. Missco Homestead Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 185 F.2d 280 (8th
Cir. 1950) ; It re Wisconsin Co-op. Milk Pool, supra note 201; Schuster v.
Ohio Farmers' Co-op. Milk Ass'n, 61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932) ; i re South
Shore Co-op. Ass'n, 4 F. Supp. 772 (W.D. N.Y. 1933) ; see Hanna, The Law
of Cooperative Marketing Associations 339 (1931). Two earlier district court
decisions are contra: l re Weeks Poultry Community, Inc., 51 F.2d 122 (S.D.
Cal. 1931) ; It re Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind. 1925).
203. E.g., it re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp.
979 (E.D. Ifich. 1937), appeal disnissed, 96 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1938);
Missco Homestead Ass'n v. United States, supra note 202, at 282 (dictum) ;
Schuster v. Ohio Farmers' Co-op. Milk Ass'n, supra note 202 at 338 (dictum).
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does so, not for the purpose of distributing gains to members, but
for the purpose of 'supporting its non-profit activity. In re Michigan
Sanitarium & Benevolent Association20 4 held ineligible for involun-
tary bankruptcy a hospital founded to care for indigents and for
people who could afford to pay for treatment, the payments of the
latter group to be used, together with gifts, solely to maintain and
improve the institution. The court stated that, "There is no reason
why a corporation, such as the respondent association here, should
be held to be a business corporation merely because in the carrying
out of its objects and purposes it performs business transactions,
which are, however, not for any one's benefit or pecuniary gain. '2 0
On the other hand, a masonic lodge was held subject to involuntary
bankruptcy because it derived substantial income from renting its
lodge rooms to groups other than Masons.2 0 6 The court's approach
is contrary to that employed in the Michigan Sanitarium case:
I am convinced that [the lodge] conducted a regular course of
transactions for the purpose of making a profit out of them and
that these transactions were on a sufficiently large scale and
sufficiently numerous to make the bankrupt a business company.
These transactions were of far more economic importance to the
204. 20 F. Supp. 979 (E.D. Mich. 1937), appeal disissed, 96 F.2d 1019(6th Cir. 1938).
205. Id. at 982.
206. In re William McKinley Lodge, 4 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. N.Y. 1933).
The case is distinguished in In re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n,
supra note 204, on the ground that the William McKinley Lodge was "an
unincorporated company." At the time In re William McKinley Lodge was
decided, section 4(b) of the Bankruptcy Act provided that, "[A]ny unicorpo-
rated company, and any moneyed, business, or commercial corporation (ex-
cept a municipal, railroad, insurance, or banking corporation, or a building
and loan association) owing debts to the amount of one thousand dollars
or over, may be adjudged an involuntary bankrupt . . ." Since "moneyed,
business, or commercial" modified only "corporation," and not "any unincorpo-
rated company," it can be argued that in order to adjudicate the William
McKinley Lodge an involuntary bankrupt, the court did not have to decide
whether or not it was moneyed, business or commercial. However, that the
court did not regard its holding as so restricted is evidenced by its statement
of the problem before it: "The only question argued was whether the bank-
rupt, an unincorporated company, was in business, so as to be included among
the possible involuntary bankrupts." 4 F. Supp. at 283. There is ample pre-
cedent for this method of handling the definition of unincorporated com-
pany. See, e.g., It re Tidewater Coal Exchange, 280 Fed. 638, 643 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 584 (1922), in which the court held an unincorporated
company subject to involuntary bankruptcy on the ground that it was a busi-
ness or commercial enterprise, and stated that, "Whether an unincorporated
company not organized for a business purpose can be adjudicated a bankrupt
under the act is not before us and is not decided." The Chandler Act elimi-
nated the phrase, "any unincorporated company," from section 4 of the
Bankruptcy Act. 58 Stat. 845 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 22 (1952). Since unincorpo-
rated companies were already included in the Act's definition of corporations,
44 Stat. 662 (1926), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 1 (1952), there is no longer
any doubt that an unincorporated company cannot be involuntary adjudicated
bankrupt unless it is moneyed, business or commercial.
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alleged bankrupt than the purely fraternal transactions which
were more closely connected with the primary object of the associ-
ation. The fact that such profit as the lodge might make from the
business transactions was not intended to be divided among
the members did not prevent the lodge from being a business
association.20 7
The court did not say that the lodge's profit-making transactions
were more important to it than its fraternal activities, but only
that the profit-making transactions were of more economic impor-
tance, an observation that is likely to be true of most corporations
which support their non-profit activities in part by a profit-making
enterprise. Since, as we shall attempt to demonstrate, the exemption
from involuntary bankruptcy of corporations that are not moneyed,
business or commercial is unsound, the more restrictive interpreta-
tion of that exemption employed in the Masons case has a certain
attraction. Nevertheless, because many corporations which Congress
obviously intended to exclude from involuntary bankruptcy carry
on incidental activity which results in profit (e.g., the church bazaar,
the university bookstore), the approach of the Masons case probably
has to be rejected as doing too much violence to Congress' purpose.
Under the present law, profit-making activity probably should not
subject a religious, charitable or educational corporation to involun-
tary bankruptcy unless the profit-making activity becomes the cor-
poration's predominant pursuit.
20 8
Different from the debtor which carries on both profit-making
and religious, charitable or educational activity, but equally trouble-
some for the courts, is the debtor which does not seek financial gain
for distribution to its members, but which cannot be regarded as
primarily religious, charitable or educational either. The position
that a debtor is not moneyed, business or commercial if it does not
seek profits was taken in Hoile v. Unity Life Insurance Company,209
where the. court said:
It is contended that Unity Life Insurance Company is a
"moneyed, business or commercial corporation" because of the
money and property which it owns and the moneys which it
collects and pays out in benefits. But this contention is untenable
because the phrase by judicial interpretation and reenactment
has acquired a meaning which limits it to corporations organized
for profit, and the facts in the pending case show that the debtor
corporation was organized under the South Carolina statute "for
207. It re William McKinley Lodge, supra note 206 at 283.
208. See In re Roumanian Workers Educational Ass'n, 108 F.2d 782
(6th Cir. 1940).
209. 136 F2d 133 (4th Cir. 1943).
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the mutual benefit of its members and their beneficiaries and not
for profit. '210
Other cases refuse to rely entirely on the profits vel non test,
but do little to define "moneyed, business or commercial," except to
indicate that it does not include religious, charitable and educational
corporations. These decisions seem to assume that there are just
some things that are unquestionably moneyed, business or com-
mercial, and no articulation of what lies behind those words is
necessary or, perhaps, even possible. Thus, an association organized
at the instance of the federal government to expedite wartime coal
shipments was held subject to involuntary bankruptcy notwithstand-
ing the absence of any possibility of pecuniary profit to the associa-
tion because, the court explained, the debtor was "engaged in the
prosecution of a business enterprise, as distinguished from one
which is charitable, or religious, or educational, or social.112 1'
Similarly, a corporation formed for the sole purpose of liquidating
the assets of an insolvent partnership was held to be moneyed, busi-
ness or commerical, the court stating only that, "[T]here would
210. Id. at 135; accord, It re Elmsford Country Club, 50 F.2d 238 (S.D.
N.Y. 1931). Since both In re Weeks Poultry Community, Inc., 51 F.2d 122(S.D. Cal. 1931), and It re Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F.2d 626 (D. Ind.
1925), proceeded on the assumption that agricultural cooperatives were non-
profit enterprises and hence not subject to involuntary bankruptcy, they sup-
port the proposition set forth in the text. However subsequent decisions
dealing with cooperatives have refused to follow these two cases. See note
202 supra.
211. It re Tidewater Coal Exchange, 280 Fed. 638, 643 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 259 U.S. 584 (1922). On the significance of the fact that the
debtor was unincorporated, see note 206 supra. In re Supreme Lodge of the
Masons Annuity, 286 Fed. 180 (N.D. Ga. 1923), is more articulate than the
other cases which attempt to define "moneyed, business or commercial"'
without reference to the profits test, but still does not take us very far
towards a definition of general applicability. Regarding a nonprofit fraternal
benefit society as moneyed, business or commercial because its activities
partook too much of the nature of insurance, the court said, "It is a fair
statement of the Georgia law that the conception of a fraternal and beneficial
society has changed from that of benevolence to one of business; the busi-
ness being insurance of a definite sort and separately regulated, but still insur-
ance. When this company departed from the plan of raising a fund to be
distributed to the aged and needy at the discretion of its governing body-
this was Masonic benevolence-to a direct obligation to pay to persons chosen,
not because of their need, but because of the relative unlikelihood of having to
pay them at all, which is business, the realm of the social and charitable was
left and that of selfishness entered; mutual insurance pure and simple was
undertaken. Calling premiums dues and policies certificates does not alter the
essence of the matter." Id. at 187. Of course, the debtor was still not subject
to bankruptcy because it was an insurance corporation. In re Order of Sparta,
242 Fed. 235 (3d Cir. 1917), is in accord with In re Supreme Lodge of the
Masons Annuity in regarding a fraternal benefit society as a business enter-
prise when insurance is its predominant activity. The Order of Sparta was
an unincorporated company, but in concluding that it ought to be adjudi-
cated, the court proceeded on the same theory employed by the cases dis-
cussed in note 206 supra.
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have to be business operations of some amount in order to liquidate
the assets .... -212
Because the cases to which Congress referred in 1910 typically
spoke of profit-seeking corporations on the one hand and religious,
charitable and educational corporations on the other, 13 the legisla-
tive history does not resolve the problem of the corporation which
is neither the one nor the other. Since our own view is that the ex-
clusion of corporations that are not moneyed, business or com-
mercial should be construed as narrowly as the legislative history
permits, and since that history does not compel the conclusion that
only profit-seeking enterprises are subject to involuntary bank-
ruptcy, we prefer the cases which admit non-profit corporations to
involuntary bankruptcy. This raises the question whether all cor-
porations which are not religious, charitable or educational should
be treated as moneyed, business or commercial. Occasional brief
dicta under both the Act of 1867 and the amendment of 1910 support
the view that social2 4 and literary215 associations are not moneyed,
212. In re Cochrane & Harper Securities Co., 27 F.2d 917, 919 (D.
Mass. 1928). The notion that "moneyed, business or commercial" has content
independent of the profits vel non standard is not confined to cases involving
corporations that do not seek financial gain. It has been used, along with the
argument that a debtor is moneyed, business or commercial if it seeks to earn
profits, to buttress holdings that agricultural marketing cooperatives are sub-
ject to involuntary bankruptcy. Thus, in In re South Shore Co-op. Ass'n,
4 F. Supp. 772, 773 (W.D. N.Y. 1933), after listing the debtor's extensive pow-
ers, the court said: "If a 'business' corporation ... means a corporation or-
ganized for profit, the alleged bankrupt is not subject to the bankruptcy law.
But the Bankruptcy Act says nothing about 'profits' in this connection. It is
quite patent from the authority conferred by the statute that the alleged
bankrupt is authorized to do 'business.' Clearly it is a business corporation in
the sense that the word 'business' is ordinarily construed. . . ." The court
went on to point out and rely on the fact that the debtor was seeking
financial benefit for its members. Accord, It re Wisconsin Co-op. Milk Pool,
119 F.2d 299 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 655 (1941) ; Schuster v. Ohio
Farmers' Co-op. Milk Ass'n, 61 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1932); cf. In re Rou-
manian Workers Educational Ass'n, 108 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1940).
213. See text at notes 199-200 supra.
214. In re Tidewater Coal Exchange, 280 Fed. 638, 643 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 259 U.S. 584 (1922) (dictum) ; In re Order of Sparta, 242 Fed. 235,
238 (3d Cir. 1917) (dictum) ; Alabama & C. R. Co. v. Jones, 1 Fed. Cas.
No. 126, at 278 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (dictum). It can be argued that In re
Elmsford Country Club, 50 F.2d 238 (S.D. N.Y. 1931), in which a corpo-
ration formed to operate a golf course for the pleasure of its members was
held not to be moneyed, business or commercial, supports the proposition
that social corporations are exempt from involuntary bankruptcy. However,
the court rested its decision entirely on the premise that a corporation is not
moneyed, business or commercial if it is not organized for financial gain. Since
the court did not recognize the possibility that a nonprofit corporation might
be moneyed, business or commercial, it did not have before it the question we
are presently concerned with, viz., if some nonprofit corporations are subject
to involuntary bankruptcy, which ought not to be?
215. Missco Homestead Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 185 F.2d 280, 282
(8th Cir. 1950) (dictum) ; In re Deauville, Inc., 52 F.2d 963, 966 (D. Nev.
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business or commercial. However, exclusion of these two types of
corporation has never received the same extensive judicial approval
that has been accorded the exemption of religious, charitable and
educational corporations, and so the conclusion that they ought to be
subject to involuntary bankruptcy would require no serious break
with existing authority. In line, then, with our desire to limit the
exclusion of corporations that are not moneyed, business or com-
mercial, we would admit social and literary corporations to involun-
tary bankruptcy and exempt only those corporations which are
religious, charitable or educational.
The ideal way to limit that exclusion would, of course, be to
abolish it entirely. Congress never attempted to explain why re-
ligious, charitable and educational corporations should be exempt
from involuntary bankruptcy and the only serious judicial attempt
to do so comes off rather lamely:
The rule that an eleemosynary corporation, charitable and
benevolent in character, not operated for pecuniary gain, is not
a "business corporation" so as to be amendable to the provisions
of the Bankruptcy Act on involuntary petition, is in accordance
with good, sound, common sense. Congress saw fit to specifically
except farmers and laborers from involuntary bankruptcy, and
there is far less reason for its excepting laborers and farmers
than for excepting an eleemosynary association... which, gen-
erally speaking, operates for the good of humanity without hope
of private gain or reward to ary individuals. All of the common-
law remedies for the collection of debts are available to those
who deal with farmers, laborers, and this kind of corporations.
Congress desired to encourage persons philanthropically inclined
to give their money and their time and services through an
eleemosynary corporation in promulgating charitable and be-
nevolent, philanthropic, and humanitarian doctrines....
Such a corporation fundamentally is entirely different from a
business or commercial corporation. In one, a man invests his
money and efforts so that he may share in its profits; in the
other, he gives his money so that the objects and purposes
of the corporation may be furthered. He receives in return no
monetary interest in the corporation. In the first, the primary
purpose is to conduct a business for the purpose of making
money. In the second, the primary purposes are philanthropic,
humanitarian, charitable, and benevolent in character. Not only
are the purposes different, but the emphasis is likewise different.
It is not easy to define this difference in words, but it stands
out readily in one's mind, as it undoubtedly did in the minds
1931) (dictum) ; In re Dairy Marketing Ass'n, 8 F2d 626, 628 (D. Ind. 1925)(dictum) ; Sweatt v. Boston, H. & E. R. Co., 23 Fed. Cas. No. 13, 684, at 534
(D. Mass. 1871) (dictum) ; Alabama & C. R. Co. v. Jones, 1 Fed. Cas. No.
126, at 278 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (dictum).
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of the lawmakers... . There are a variety of reasons, most of
them apparent, why such a corporation should be specially dealt
with.218
While the preceding passage is commendably pregnant with
good will towards man, it offers little by way of solid argument in
support of the exemption of religious, charitable and educational
corporations from involuntary bankruptcy. That the court sees no
good reason for excepting farmers and laborers from involuntary
bankruptcy does not, of course, justify the existence of other excep-
tions. The notion that the ineligibility of eleemosynary corporations
for involuntary bankruptcy influences in any way potential donors
of time and money seems incredible to us.
The court's only other point is that creditors of the excluded
corporations still have their common-law remedies for debt collec-
tion. Analysis of this argument, we think, reveals that it provides as
much support for abolishing the exclusions as it does for continuing
them. If Congress had succeeded in liberating religious, charitable
and educational corporations from involuntary liquidation, the
absence of a means to compel ratable distribution of an insolvent
debtor's assets coupled with the power of individual creditors to
reach those assets would encourage creditors to seek preferences,
either by persuasion or by legal action, and the scramble could be
stopped only by the debtor's invocation of the Bankruptcy Act.
While reposing sole power in the debtor to call a halt would permit
it to struggle on a bit longer than it otherwise might, this added
life would probably be purchased at the cost of equal treatment of
creditors. Consequently, those creditors who were slow to press
hard for collection would wind up subsidizing the debtor's last
days, a result at variance with the policy which underlies holding
religious, charitable and educational corporations liable for their
debts. It seems to us that once a debtor has become insolvent the
only interests to be protected are those of creditors, unless there is a
reasonable chance of revival. Surely, then, creditors should have
the right to insist that the assets of the debtor be distributed equably.
If there is a chance for revival, the arrangement and corporate re-
organization provisions of the Bankruptcy Act can be used to con-
tinue the enterprise without sacrificing the interest of creditors in
pro rata payment.
The foregoing argument is premised on the assumption that
Congress achieved its apparent purpose to liberate religious, educa-
216. lip re Michigan Sanitarium & Benevolent Ass'n, 20 F. Supp. 979,
982 (R.D. Mich. 1937), appeal dismnissed, 96 F.2d 1019 (6th Cir. 1938).
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tional and charitable corporations from involuntary liquidation. To
a considerable extent this assumption is unfounded. During the
periods in which our country had no national bankruptcy law, a
number of states enacted their own bankruptcy statutes,217 and while
these statutes are universally regarded as suspended by the Bank-
ruptcy Act for most purposes,"- some courts have held that the
involuntary provisions of their local statutes are still applicable to
debtors excluded from involuntary bankruptcy. 2 9 Ironically enough,
among the reasons commonly offered in support of this view is the
argument that Congress could not conceivably have intended to
leave creditors without the right to compel equal distribution of an
insolvent debtor's assets.22 0 Other courts, probably more accurate in
divining Congress' purpose in excluding certain debtors from in-
voluntary bankruptcy only, have held their state bankruptcy statutes
as inapplicable to these debtors as to those which are subject to
both voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy.22' However, that credi-
217. For a list of states having insolvency laws which embody many of
the features of the Bankruptcy Act, see 5 Remington, Bankruptcy § 2108
(5th ed. 1953).
218. E.g., International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261 (1929) ; First
Nat. Bank in Albuquerque v. Robinson, 107 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1939).
219. E.g., Pitcher v. Standish, 90 Conn. 601, 98 Atl. 93 (1916); Old
Town Bank v. McCormick, 96 Md. 341, 53 AUt. 934 (1903) ; Lace v. Smith,
34 R.I. 1, 82 AUt. 268 (1912). Additional authorities are collected in Annot.,
1917A L.R.A. 109. The cases on this subject typically involve involuntary
proceedings against a farmer, and, in fact, we have been able to find no post-
1910 cases which decide whether the involuntary provisions of a state insol-
vency law otherwise suspended by the Bankruptcy Act remain operative as to
a charitable, religious or educational corporation. Nevertheless, the rationales
of the cases permitting farmers to be involuntarily adjudicated under state
law are equally applicable to all of the debtors excluded solely from involun-
tary bankruptcy. Cf. State Nat. Bank v. Syndicate Co., 178 Fed. 359 (W.D.
Ark. 1910) ; R. H. Herron Co. v. Superior Court of City and County of San
Francisco, 136 Cal. 279, 68 Pac. 814 (1902); Rogers v. Boston Club, 205
Mass. 261, 91 N.E. 321 (1910).
220. See, e.g., Pitcher v. Standish, supra note 219, at 609, 98 Atl. at 96:
"[In the absence of involuntary proceedings, creditors] are left to the ordi-
nary, and frequently inadequate, machinery of the law or the debtor's volition
for their protection. They are powerless to compel an equal distribution of
his assets among them. ... They cannot secure it against his will. We can
hardly assume that Congress intended to deprive creditors of that right,
generally if not universally accorded to them by the states.... We can more
readily believe that Congress deemed it wiser that Federal jurisdiction be not
assumed in the matter of proceedings in invitum, and that such action be left
for State regulation. .. "
221. Closser v. Strawn, 227 Fed. 139 (D.C. Pa. 1915); Littlefield v.
Gay, 96 Me. 422, 52 At. 925 (1902) ; Adrian State Bank v. Klinkhammer, 182
Minn. 57, 233 N.W. 588 (1930), 15 Minn. L. Rev. 582 (1931) ; see Williston,
The Effect of a National Bankruptcy Law Upon State Laws, 22 Harv. L.
Rev. 547, 549-555 (1909) ; Comment, (1938) Wis. L. Rev. 302. The Supreme
Court of the United States has never passed on whether a state may enact
bankruptcy statute for debtors eligible for voluntary, but ineligible for in-
voluntary bankruptcy. The statement in International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,
278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929), that, "States may not pass or enforce laws to inter-
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tors of the excluded corporations have no local bankruptcy act to
which they can resort in the latter group of states and in states
which have no bankruptcy statute does not necessarily mean that
they are impotent to compel liquidation or rehabilitation of a re-
ligious, charitable or educational corporation. The existence of the
Bankruptcy Act does not prevent liquidation or rehabilitation of a
troubled corporation via an equity receivership, 222 nor does it sus-
pend a statute which can be construed as being merely in aid of the
equitable remedy.22 3 In addition, statutes in some states confer on
creditors the right to sue for the dissolution of an insolvent corpora-
tion, and, as an incident to the termination of the corporation's
existence, its assets will be liquidated and the proceeds distributed to
fere with or complement the Bankruptcy Act or to provide additional or
auxiliary regulations," supports the position taken by the authorities cited in
this note, but nothing in the opinion indicates whether the Court had in mind
the problem under consideration here when it uttered that statement. Further-
more, the Court's later decisions in Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd Co., 287 U.S.
518 (1933), and Johnson v. Star, 287 U.S. 527 (1933), demonstrate quite
dearly that the dictum in Pinkus overstates the limitations on state action in
the bankruptcy field. For discussion of the general problem of what provisions
in a state statute will or should result in suspension by the Bankruptcy Act,
see, e.g., Glenn, Liquidation 208-213, 304-308 (1935); Miller, The Illinois
Business Corporation Act and Bankruptcy Legislation, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 695
(1935) ; Radin, The Nature of Bankruptcy, 89 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1940).
222. E.g., Stevens v. Carolina Scenic Stages, 208 F.2d 332 (4th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 917 (1954) ; In re Schwartz Bros., Inc. 58 F.
Supp. 761 (D. Minn. 1945), 30 Minn. L. Rev. 638 (1946); Hazelwood v.
Olinger Bldg. Department Stores, Inc., 205 Wis. 85, 236 N.W. 591 (1931).
See note 136 supra for discussion of the authorities on whether a receiver will
be appointed over a debtor's objection if the petitioning creditor is unsecured
and has not recovered judgment and had execution returned unsatisfied.
223. A Minnesota statute which only slightly embroidered the equity
receivership was sustained in It re Schwartz Bros., Inc., 58 F. Supp. 761
(D. Minn. 1945), 30 Minn. L. Rev. 638 (1946), the court concluding, at 766,
that, "[W]here the state law has no other bankruptcy attributes but a distri-
bution of the assets in sequestration proceedings, where a solvent as well as
an insolvent corporation may be proceeded against by a creditor, and where
it fairly appears that the statute was merely enacted for the purpose of
aiding a court of equity in carrying out its inherent equitable powers, the
absence of a discharge provision in the statute under such circumstances is
highly significant." A similar approach was employed to sustain a more
elaborate Wisconsin statute in Hazelwood v. Olinger Bldg. Department
Stores, Inc., 205 Wis. 85, 236 N.W. 591 (1931), but the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit refused to accept a similar argument in striking down a
rather mild New Mexico statute in First Nat. Bank in Albuquerque v. Robin-
son, 107 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1939). The more elaborate the statutory scheme,
the greater the likelihood that a court will refuse to view the statute as merely
in aid of the equitable remedy and will hold the statute suspended by the
Bankruptcy Act. See, for example, the involuntary provisions of the Wiscon-
sin statute which were recently treated as suspended in In re Wisconsin
Builders Supply Co., 239 F.2d 649 (7th Cir. 1956). And, of course, an express
provision for discharge of the debtor is certain to result in either suspension
of that provision or of the whole statute. E.g., Pobreslo v. Joseph M. Boyd
Co., 287 U.S. 518 (1933) (dictum).
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creditors.2 ' The authorities are divided on whether such statutes are
suspended by the Bankruptcy Act.22 5
Since state law will often give creditors some sort of remedy to
compel liquidation or rehabilitation of a religious, charitable or
educational corporation, the picture we painted earlier of creditors
powerless to compel a fair distribution of their insolvent debtor's
assets is obviously overdrawn. Nevertheless, it is substantially more
difficult to force a religious, charitable or educational corporation
into insolvency proceedings than would be the case if these associa-
tions were subject to bankruptcy: many states do not have insol-
vency laws; others have such laws but hold them suspended even
as to debtors exempt from involuntary bankruptcy; many states
will not grant an equity receivership on petition of a creditor who
has not yet recovered judgment; some states do not permit dissolu-
tion of a religious, charitable or educational corporation on petition
of a creditor, and some others require the petitioning creditor to
recover judgment first. Furthermore, the remedies offered by the
states as a substitute for involuntary bankruptcy are not nearly so
effective as the Bankruptcy Act in insuring equal treatment of
creditors. For example, a state remedy may provide no way to set
aside preferences made shortly before the commencement of the
proceeding. In addition, if an excluded corporation operates across
state lines, the problems of interstate insolvency administration dis-
cussed earlier are likely to be present. 226 There is no reason to put
up with these disadvantages. While it can at least be argued, though
unpersuasively we think, that insolvency administration of banks,
insurance corporations and building and loan associations can be
handled best by the state authorities which supervise those organiza-
tions during their business lives,2 27 the absence of comparable state
supervision of religious, charitable and educational corporations
224. See 16 Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations§ 8079 (Wolf ed. 1942) ; Glenn, Liquidation c. 19 (1935). Some of the states
which accord creditors the right to petition for the dissolution of a business
corporation deny that right with respect to nonprofit corporations. See, e.g.,
Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 317.44-317.62 (Supp. 1956); N.Y. Gen. Corp. Law § 130(1943).
225. In re Distillers Factors Corp., 187 F.2d 685 (3d Cir.), cert. denaied,
342 U.S. 824 (1951), held such a statute valid. Accord, Lyon v. Russell, 41
App. D.C. 554 (1914); see Glenn, Liquidation 378-380 (1935). Contrary
authorities are collected in 5 Remington, Bankruptcy § 2118 (5th ed. 1953) ;
see Miller, The Illinois Business Corporation Act and Bankruptcy Legisla-
tion, 29 Ill. L. Rev. 695 (1935) ; Note, 5 Rutgers L. Rev. 391, 405-409 (1951) ;
Comment, The Effect of the National Bankruptcy Code Upon the Uniform
Business Corporations Act, 23 Wash. L. Rev. 60 (1948) ; cf. First Nat. Bank
in Albuquerque v. Robinson, 107 F.2d 50 (10th Cir. 1939).
226. See text at notes 130, 162-163 supra.
227. See text at note 55 supra.
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renders even this argument unavailable on behalf of their exemption.
In sum, the exclusion from involuntary bankruptcy of corpora-
tions that are not moneyed, business or commercial makes unfair
treatment of creditors possible, and neither facilitates the operation
of such enterprises during their lives nor achieves the soundest
administration of them when they become insolvent. This exclusion
should be abolished.
V. CONCLUSION
Insolvency can afflict any sort of enterprise that incurs debts,
and when it does, the stricken corporation and its creditors obvi-
ously should have available the most helpful remedy our legal system
presently offers. We have attempted to demonstrate that this prin-
ciple is violated by the exclusion from involuntary bankruptcy of
corporations that are not moneyed, business or commercial, and by
the complete exclusion from bankruptcy of insurance corporations,
state banks and state building and loan associations. The situation
with respect to corporations that are not moneyed, business or
commercial can most easily be corrected. Since there is no reason
why such corporations should not be subject to involuntary bank-
ruptcy like any other corporation, all that is needed is an amendment
to section 4b of the Bankruptcy Act, striking the words, "moneyed,
business or commercial." The solution for insurance companies and
state banks and state building and loan associations is more com-
plicated. The operations of these debtors are sufficiently different
from those of most other corporations, and from those of each other,
to make it inadvisable to simply bring them under the straight
bankruptcy and corporate reorganization provisions. We suggest,
therefore, that special bankruptcy chapters, dealing with the special
problems of these corporations, be adopted.
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